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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF WORKMANLIKE PERFORMANCE-ONE WHO CONTRACTS TO PROVIDE MARITIME SERVICES IMPLIEDLY AGREES TO PERFORM IN A DILIGENT AND WORKMANLIKE
MANNER

Plaintiffs' sought recovery for damages to their vessel resulting
from its grounding on a dike. Due to tide and wind conditions the
vessel was unable to make way while trying to come into port to
take on bunkers (fuel oil), and her pilot radioed for tug assistance.
The tugs, which were provided by the defendant2 as an incident of
a contract between plaintiffs and defendant for bunkers, closed
with the vessel but failed to attach tow lines, and she subsequently
drifted aground.3 Plaintiff alleged that defendant had contracted
to furnish, among other things, tug assistance and pilotage and
that this contract contained an implied warranty of workmanlike
performance which was breached as a result of the tugs' conduct.
The defendant denied the existence of the implied warranty in the
contract or, alternatively, that the implied warranty had been
breached.4 The district court judge held for the plaintiffs, reasoning that the tugs were in the best position to prevent the accident 5
1. Fairmont Shipping Corporation and Fairwinds Ocean Carrier Corporation
were seeking to recover damages suffered by their steamship Western Eagle.

2. Chevron International Oil Company (Chevron) offered a host of services to
ships taking on bunkers at Flushing, Netherlands, in an attempt to make Flushing an attractive port for resupply of bunkers. Tug assistance was actually provided by Chevron's subcontractor or agent, Steenkolen Handelsvereeiging (SHV).
3. The two tugs Sophia and Fredrik Hendrik proceeded from port as soon as
they were called upon. They approached the Western Eagle in the dark in a dense
fog, according to the testimony of the tug captains, and while attempting to
attach lines had to veer away due to traffic on the river. By the time tow ropes
were finally attached, the Western Eagle was aground.
4. Chevron did not challenge on appeal the finding that it was obligated under
the bunker supply contract to provide tug assistance. 511 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975).
In the lower court Chevron denied in the alternative, the existence of the contract,
the existence of any clause in the contract for pilotage or towage, any implied
warranty, or any conduct by the tugs which constituted a breach of any warranty.
371 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5. This rationale was established by the Supreme Court in a stevedoring case,
ItaliaSocieta per Azione di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315
(1964). The Court in Italia implied that the issue of breach of contract turned on
a factual determination, placing liability upon the party best situated to adopt
preventative measures and thereby reducing the likelihood of injury. 376 U.S. at
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and, by failing to adopt measures to prevent it, breached the implied warranty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held affirmed. An implied warranty of workmanlike performance exists in maritime service contracts as in other service
contracts where one who contracts to provide services impliedly
agrees to perform in a diligent and workmanlike manner. Fairmont
Shipping Corporationv. Chevron International Oil Company, 511
F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S. Oct.
6, 1975).
The implied warranty of workmanlike performance was originally incorporated into maritime service contracts by the courts to
help mitigate the shipowner's exposure to liability under section
933 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act of 1927 (LHWCA),' under which a longshoreman injured while
working aboard a ship may elect to sue the shipowner in tort. In
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,7 a suit brought against a shipowner
under the section 933 election, the Supreme Court said that the
shipowner's liability arose under the doctrine of unseaworthiness
which created an absolute duty, not turning on fault, owed by the
shipowner to furnish a seaworthy ship for longshoremen. 8 Several
cases subsequent to Sieracki broadened the scope of the doctrine
of unseaworthiness9 and thus significantly increased the ship324. Through this rationale the Court in Italia was able to place 100 per cent of
the loss on the stevedoring company by allowing indemnification, even though the
stevedoring company had non-negligently provided inadequate equipment.
6. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 44 Stat.
1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et. seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as LHWCA].
The LHWCA made employers liable without fault to compensate their employees
for injuries that were work connected. In return for this statutory remedy the
longshoremen were precluded by the section 905 exclusivity provisions from seeking recovery based on any tort liability of the employer to the employee. Section
933 allowed the longshoreman to elect to seek a remedy against a third party who
might be liable for his injury in lieu of seeking the statutory remedy from his
employer. It has been held that after accepting compensation payments from his
employer without an award, the longshoreman may sue a third party tortfeasor
for his injuries, with the employer being indemnified out of any award recovered.
American v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947).
7. 328 U.S. 85 (1946). The Supreme Court held that longshoremen were "seamen" insofar as that status made them persons to whom a duty to provide a
seaworthy ship was owed by the shipowner.
8. The unseaworthiness doctrine's applicability to stevedoring suits has been
eliminated by the 1972 amendment to the LHWCA. Section 905(b), added by the
amendment, provides that shipowners cannot be held liable to longshoremen on
the basis of the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach of that warranty.
9. See, e.g., Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1954) (an unu-
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owner's exposure to liability for tort claims. The Supreme Court
in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.'I denied
contribution to the shipowner from a longshoreman's employer
who was a joint tortfeasor. The combination of Sieracki and
Halcyon put the shipowner in the impossible position of being
solely liable for any injury which could conceivably exceed the
LHWCA statutory award. In apparent recognition of the shipowner's untenable position, the Supreme Court, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.," allowed a shipowner full

indemnity for negligence chargeable to a stevedore-employer
which resulted in injury to a longshoreman.' 2 The Court found an
implied warranty of workmanlike performance, which allowed the

shipowner to seek indemnification from the stevedore-employer on
a breach of contract theory and thus avoid the exclusive remedy
provision of section 905 of the LHWCA.' 3 Ryan was an attempt by
sually cantankerous deck man who, while drunk, attacked the plaintiff with a
knife, rendered the ship unseaworthy); Lahde v. Societa Armadora del Norte, 220
F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1956) (ship was deemed
unseaworthy when plaintiff fell through an open hatch unseen in the dim light).
10. 342 U.S. 282 (1952) (the stevedore-employer was found to be 75 per cent
responsible for the longshoreman's injury, the shipowner 25 per cent responsible.)
11. 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The longshoreman was injured when an insufficient
wooden brace for a roll of pulpboard gave way. The evidence showed that the
pulpboard roll that injured the longshoreman had been improperly stowed by the
contractor at the previous port. The Court distinguished Halcyon by pointing out
that it dealt with contribution and not indemnification.
12. For a comprehensive discussion of this indemnification principle and cases
prior to and following Ryan see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
§ 6-55 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]. See also Comment,
Workmen's Compensation:FederalLongshoreman's and Harbor Workers' CompensationAct: Shipowner's Right to Indemnity Against Employer, 44 CALIF. L.
REv. 800 (1956); Stover, Longshoreman-Shipowner-Stevedore: The Circle of
Liability, 61 MICH. L. REv. 539 (1963); White, A New Look at the Shipowner's
Right-Over for Shipboard Injuries, 12 STAN. L. REv. 717 (1960); Comment,
Indemnity-Stevedore's Warranty of Workmanlike Service Extends to Latent
Defects in Equipment He Provides, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 893 (1964).
13. The Court carefully noted that it was not required to deal with the exclusive remedy provision of the LHWCA with regard to an action against the employer. 350 U.S. at 132. The Court felt that the LHWCA protected the employer

only from claims arising from tortious conduct causing injury to the employee,
but gave no relief from contractual obligations voluntarily assumed. This rationale has been reached in state courts in cases dealing with workmen's compensation. See Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Corp., 278 N.Y. 175,
15 N.E.2d 567 (App. Div. 1938); 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, §§

76.00-76.44(a) (1975). See generally Weinstock, The Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by HarborWorkers, 103 U. PITT. L. REv.
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the Court to even out the burden between the shipowner and other
joint tortfeasors, but the aftermath of Ryan has been the opposite
extreme from the earlier sole liability of the shipowner. For example, in Italia Societa per Azione di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co. 4 the Court awarded complete indemnification to a
shipowner when the employer of an injured longshoreman was in
no way negligent. The Court in Ryan indicated that recovery on
the breach of a contractual obligation such as an implied warranty
may turn upon the standard of performance by the contractor but
this fact does not change the nature of the action into tort. 5 This
standard of performance for determining breach of contract also
has given courts difficulty. In Italia no negligence was required

while in Bouchard TransportationCo. v. Tug Gillen Brothers" the
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
negligence was required for a breach of an implied warranty in a
towage contract. The Ryan decision was brought about by a desire
to settle the issue of indemnity between a shipowner and a
stevedore-contractor,' 7 and until recently the Ryan principle of
implied warranty of workmanlike performance has been applied
only in cases dealing with claims for indemnification from third
parties.'8 But a warranty of workmanlike performance similar to
321 (1954). The exclusivity provision of § 905 was nullified by the Court in Reed
v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), through the device of declaring a bareboat
charterer the owner pro hac vice of the vessel, making the employer the shipowner, and allowing the injured employee to sue him in that capacity, LHWCA
§ 905 exclusivity notwithstanding. This nullification of a statute by the courts has
generated much comment. See GILMORE & BLACK § 6-56; Comment, Risk Distribution and Unseaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174 (1966); Note, Personificationof
Vessels, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1964).
14. See note 5 supra. The Court said that "[Tihe absence of negligence on
the part of the stevedore ...

is not fatal to the shipowner's claim of indemnity

15. 350 U.S. at 134.
16. 389 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For a pre-Ryan discussion of the standard of performance see Weinstock, The Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor Workers, 103 U. Pirr. L. REV. 321 (1954).
17. Long, StevedoringAgreements and the Warranty of Workmanlike Service,
23 INS. COUNSEL J. 170 (1956).

18. See note 21 infra. In Bouchard Transportation Co., 389 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), a case decided on January 24, 1975, only ten days prior to the
instant case, the district court held that the owner of a petroleum barge could

recover for damages which resulted from its barge going aground while under tow

by the defendant's tug. The barge owner brought action against the tug, the tug
owners, and a wharfinger based on a contract for tow between the barge owner
and the towing company. The district court held that the pilot of the tug was
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that of Ryan19 has been implied in maritime service contracts involving towage. In James McWilliams Blue Line, Inc. v. Esso
Standard Oil Co. 2 1 the court relied on Ryan to recharacterize a suit,
in which a time charterer of a barge sought to implead a tug owner
for damages claimed by the charterer in possession, from one of
impleader to one of indemnity. The cases following the Blue Line
21
application of the implied warranty principle to towage contracts
negligent in his work, that the towing company had accordingly breached its
warranty to tow the barge in a safe and workmanlike manner, and that the
wharfinger was negligent in failing to provide a safe approach to the terminal. The
district court cited Blue Line in finding an implied warranty saying that the "very
nature of a towage contract necessarily implies an obligation to tow properly,
safely and competently." 389 F. Supp. at 82. The court cited In re Moran Inland
Waterways Corp., 320 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1971), in its discussion of the manner in which to treat the implied warranty and
dealt with the warranty as requiring negligence for breach.
19. Ironically, while the exact situation giving birth to Ryan is statutorily
exempted, see note 8 supra, the doctrine lives on. See, e.g., H & H Ship Service
Co. v. Weyerhause Line, 383 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1967) (ship cleaning contract);
Mortensen v. A/S Glittre, 348 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1965) (ship painting); Dunbar v.
Henry Du Bois' Sons Co., 275 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 815

(1960) (towage contract).
20. 245 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1957). The charterer in possession stood in the place
of the barge owner and was seeking recovery for damages which the barge suffered
while under time charter. The time charterer impleaded the tug owner whose tug
was towing the barge when it was damaged. The court seized on the doctrine of
implied warranty of workmanlike performance to enable it to sidestep the central
issue in the case which was the effect of laches on the time charterer's petition of
impleader. While laches might have barred recovery under a theory of negligence
with a three year period of limitation under state statute, recovery would have
been allowed on a theory of breach of contract with a six year period of limitation.
Adopting the breach of implied warranty as the basis for the impleader allowed
the court to eliminate the laches issue.
21. In re Moran Inland Waterways Corp., 320 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(tug owner sought indemnification from the barge owner or contribution from the
barge owner for amount the tug owner paid in settlement of claim for death of
bargeman and damage to the barge, and the barge owner sought contribution
from tug owner for amount the barge owner contributed to the settlement of the
death claims); United States v. The Manzanillo, 190 F. Supp. 229 (D. Ore. 1960)
(action by shipowner against tug and owner for amounts paid to ship captain who
was injured on tug), aff'd, 310 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1962) (entire amount of maintenance and cure paid to ship captain by shipowner was recoverable); T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. George W. Whiteman Towing, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D. La.
1970) (shipowner brought action for indemnity from tugowner where tug was
liable for a defective heaving line which caused injury to a crewman of the shipowner's vessel in breach of implied warranty of workmanlike performance); B.
Tibbs v. Baker-Whitely Towing Co., 271 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1967) (United
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have adopted all the extensions of the Ryan decision. 2 The Ryantype indemnity springs from the shipowner's strict liability for
unseaworthiness23 with the result that the shipowner is exposed to
liability regardless of fault24 but is able to pass this liability on to
vehicle of an implied warthe employer-contractor through the
25
ranty of workmanlike performance.

In the instant case the court's analysis of the background of
Ryan showed clearly that this was not a Ryan-type case. 6 The
States entitled to indemnity from tug owner for recovery paid by United States
to shipowner whose ship had been seized by United States Marshall and was
damaged while being moved by tug under oral contract with United States Marshall); Texas Co. v. The Margret A. Moran, 375 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(towing company was entitled to a decree over against the owner of tug who had
leased the tug on a time charter to towing company, the court, refusing to follow
Blue Line, held that the suit rested on a theory of tort negligence).
22. Subsequent to Ryan it was held in Drago v. A/S Inger, 194 F. Supp. 398
(E.D.N.Y. 1961), that attorneys' fees incurred by the shipowner in attempting to
defend against the plaintiff's claim were part of the indemnity recoverable. A
further development in Caswell v. Koninklyke Nederlansche Stoomboot
Maalschappy, 205 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Tex. 1962), allowed the shipowner to recover all damages resulting from the breach of warranty, even where successfully
defended against plaintiff's claim. Attorneys' fees and damages for breach in

cases where the main claim had been successfully defended against were not
made part of the indemnity in towage contract cases until Singer v. Dorr, 272 F.
Supp. 931 (E.D. La. 1967). The court in Singer held that all the ramifications of
the Ryan doctrine should apply to the towage situations, despite the fact that the
plaintiff could sue the tug owner directly, while in the Ryan situation the plaintiff
was barred by the § 905 exclusivity provision of the LHWCA from suing the
stevedoring company. The court in Singer based its holding on the rationale that
the Ryan doctrine was conceived to equitably place the burden of defending and
paying claims on the party who was in control and whose actions resulted in the
claim being brought rather than on the party technically liable, and there was
no reason not to make the same equitable adjustment in the towage situation.
23. E.g., Schwartz v. Compagnie G~nerale Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270 (2d
Cir. 1968) "[A]ny equitable considerations underlying the decision of the courts
to require indemnity by applying the implied warranty of workmanlike service are
ultimately derived from a shipowner's liabilities under the seaworthiness guarantee . .

. ."

405 F.2d at 276. This position was supported by the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals when it held in Davis v. Charles Kruz & Co., 483 F.2d 184 (9th
Cir. 1973), that Ryan was inapplicable because the shipowner's unseaworthiness
liability had been removed while the vessel was in a repair facility and was a dead
ship.
24. See note 7 supra.
25. Italia Societa per Azione di Navigazione v. Oregon Shipping Co. 376 U.S.
315 (1964).
26. The court made this very observation. 511 F.2d at 269.
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court indicated that the primary issue in Ryan was the indemnification of the shipowner, with the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance providing the means by which the indemnification
could be allowed. The court pointed out that the question of
whether a warranty creates an obligation to indemnify (the Ryan
issue) is entirely separate from the question of whether a contract

includes a warranty of workmanlike performance (the issue in the
instant case). The court did not feel compelled to determine if an
implied warranty of workmanlike performance, such as exists in
non-maritime service contracts," was applicable to maritime service contracts because by its reasoning Ryan had already made the
determination that such a warranty was applicable. The court took
the view that maritime service contracts are no different than nonmaritime service contracts, at least as far as an implied warranty
of workmanlike performance is concerned. Here the court saw its
task as quite simply determining whether an implied warranty of
workmanlike performance existed in the contract at hand. The
court found an implied warranty of workmanlike performance in
the instant contract and then it only remained for the court to
determine whether or not the warranty was breached. The court
adopted the rationale of Italia that a warranty of workmanlike
performance can be breached by non-negligent as well as negligent
conduct. 28 The court applied the "clearly erroneous" rule 9 to the
district court's fact finding and affirmed the lower court's holding
that there was a breach of the implied warranty. The court further
held that plaintiffs' own negligence would have been a bar to their
claim only had it been an "active hindrance" to the defendant's
performance. 0 The court found no such hindrance in the instant
case.
Judge Mansfield, in dissent, did not accept the majority's inter27. 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1012(c), at 36-39 (3d ed. Jaeger ed. 1967).
See, e.g., Wilham Beadenkopf Co. v. Henwood & Newark, Inc., 14 F.2d 125 (D.
Mass. 1926) (contract to tan goat skins); In re Estate of Talbott, 184 Kan. 501,
337 P.2d 986 (1959) (contract to install plumbing); Henggeler v. Hindra, 191 Neb.

317, 214 N.W.2d 925 (1974) (construction contract).
28. For a discussion of the Italia rationale see note 5 supra.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides: "[Flindings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." E.g., Hart v. Blakemore, 410
F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. See Albanese v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik Stoomv. Maats., 346 F.2d 481, 484
(2d Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 283 (1965); See generally 9 S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1012(c), at 36-39 (3d ed. Jaeger ed. 1967).
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pretation of the implied warranty as to its nature or extent. He felt
that since the plaintiffs' ship was never under the defendant's
control, defendant's tugs were not required to exercise more care
than could have been reasonably required of them under the traditional approach to breach of towage contracts.32 He did not accept the district court's fact finding as sufficient to establish negli-

gence under a standard of reasonable performance.
In the instant case the court took the position that recovery for
damages which occur during towage is founded in contract through
an action for breach of an implied warranty. This is a departure
from the traditional approach in admiralty which has been to regard the recovery of such damages as based on tort.3 3 It would
appear that by adopting a contract approach and then applying a
standard that requires no negligence for breach the court has made
the breach of an implied warranty for workmanlike performance
the occasion for imposing strict liability against the towing contractor. This same court, as late as 1970, in M.P. Howletter, Inc.
v. Tug Michael Moran, adhered to the requirement of negligence
in establishing liability for damages occuring to a tow. 3 1 This author feels that the adoption of the contract approach to maritime
service contracts is not in itself undesirable. Unfortunately, the
court chose to adopt the Italia non-negligence rationale which,
considering the policy reasons for Ryan and subsequent cases,
made sense for indemnity situations in that there was a need, at
31. See Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195 (1932); The John G. Stevens,
170 U.S. 113 (1898). See generally 1 E.C. BENEDICT, JURISDICTION & PRINCIPLES §
231 (7th ed. 1974).
32. See The Edward G. Murrary, 278 F. 895 (2d Cir. 1922).
33. The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113 (1898). The John G. Stevens has never
been overruled and must be regarded as good law. GILMORE & BLACK § 9-61.5.
Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195 (1932), in dictum reaffirmed the holding

in The John G. Stevens: "[T]he claim [for damages occasioned by negligent
towage], like those in case of collision, is one in tort arising out of duty imposed
by law and independently of any contract or consideration for the towage." See
generally 1 E.C. BENEDICT, JURISDICTION & PRINCIPLES § 231 (7th ed. 1974); 86

C.J.S. Towage §§ 34, 38 (1954).
34. 425 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970) (barge was shipping water and tug had to cast
off and abandon it to sink). Other courts have continued to adhere to this requirement for negligence. See, e.g., Mid-America Transp. Co. v. National Marine
Serv., Inc., 497 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1974) (a case strikingly similar to the instant
case where a barge went aground while under the tow of a tugi; Hart v. Blakemore, 410 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1969) (tug beached a house boat which started to
sink while in tow); Hournu Well Service, Inc. v. Tug Capt. O'Brien, 312 F. Supp.
257 (E.D. La. 1970) (barge sank while in tug's tow).
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least as seen by the courts, 35 to encourage prevention of accidents.
While this is a desirable goal for non-indemnity situations, as in
the instant case, it would seem that the use of the doctrine of
comparative negligence in admiralty would have the same effect,
without the additional disadvantage of burdening one of the parties with all the loss. It would have been far better for the court to
have followed the rationale in Ryan that the existence of breach
could turn on the standard of performance 6 and then to have used
a standard of reasonableness requiring negligence for a breach to
3
exist. 1
Cleatous J. Simmons
35. The Court in Italia said:
We deal here with a suit for indemnification based upon a maritime contract, governed by federal law ...

in an area where rather special rules

governing the obligations and liability of shipowners prevail, rules that are

designed to minimize the hazards encountered by seamen, to compensate
seamen for accidents that inevitably occur, and to minimize the likelihood
of such accidents. By placing the burden ultimately on the company whose

default caused the injury ... we think our decision today is in furtherance
of those objectives. 376 U.S. at 324.
For an exhaustive treatment of the policy of the cases following Ryan see
Proudfoot, "The Tarbaby", Maritime Personal Injury Indemnity Actions, 20
STAN. L. REv. 423 (1967-1968). An interesting discussion of policy with regard to

"duty" is found in Harvey, Contracts-Breachof Duty-Liability Respectively of
Shipper & Carrier,47 CAN. BAR. REV. 299 (1969).
36.
37.

See text accompanying note 15 supra.
See note 18 supra.

ADMIRALTY-FEDERAL COURT HAS ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION OVER
AVIATION TORT WHEN FLIGHT SERVED THE PURPOSE OF MARITIME

ACTIVITY
On October 21, 1972, an Olympic Airways flight from the Greek
island of Corfu to Athens crashed into the Greek territorial waters,
of Voula Bay while on approach to the Athens airport. One passenger on this flight was Caroline Hammill Cagle, a United States
citizen and a resident of Virginia. After her death in the crash, the
administrator of the estate sought damages in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for wrongful death2
under the general maritime law, 3 along with other theories of recovery. 4 The parties agreed by stipulation that any negligence of defendant's pilot would have taken place somewhere above the Mediterranean Sea, over international waters. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of admiralty jurisdiction and for failure
to state a claim, arguing that an airplane crash into the sea does
not have a sufficient maritime nexus under general maritime law
to support admiralty jurisdiction and is not specifically provided
for by statute. The District Court held motion to dismiss denied.
The nature of the flight is determinative, and admiralty jurisdiction is proper when the flight served a purpose that had traditionally been carried on by surface-going maritime vessels. Hammill
1. If the crash had occurred more than one marine league (three miles) from
shore, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) would have provided jurisdiction for wrongful death claims. 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (1920).
2. Damages for conscious pain and suffering, loss of support on behalf of
decedent's niece and two nephews, and punitive damages for the willful misconduct of defendant's pilot were also sought.
3. Jurisdiction over maritime causes of action is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1970). In general, advantages of the admiralty forum are the availability of the
uniform body of federal maritime law; the possibility of consolidating claims with
federal courts having exclusive jurisdiction over the action; and the fact that
contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery, but only a mitigating factor. See
Note, 47 TuL. L. REv. 1143 (1973). Advantages of the admiralty forum are discussed in Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction-The Sky's the Limit, 33 J.
Am L. & CoM. 3, 3-4 (1967).
4. Recovery was also sought to be based (1) on the general common law cause
of action for wrongful death, (2) the "Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations
of the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol, on Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) Order No. E-23680 (The "Montreal Agreement"), and obligations under-

taken by defendant under the Tariff and Agreement (CAB No. 16712 and Order
No. E-24571, approved by CAB on December 29, 1966); (3) a wrongful death claim
based on the general common law theory of absolute liability; and (4) a wrongful
death claim founded on DOHSA.
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v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 398 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1975).
The Constitution provides that admiralty jurisdiction resides in
the federal courts,5 and powers over maritime law were vested in
Congress.' The previously existing substantive law in admiralty
was governing,' but "the precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is
not a matter of obvious principle or of very accurate history."'
Many are the tests that have been utilized to resolve the puzzling
question of jurisdiction. The locality test has traditionally been
determinative of admiralty jurisdiction? In 1389 Parliment restricted admiralty jurisdiction to "a thing done upon the sea."'" As
late as 1876,. the common law jurisdiction in England was conceived to stop at the low water mark." In the United States, the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was held in DeLovio v. Boit

in 1815 to include all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries, with
tort jurisdiction bounded by maritime locality. 2 The Supreme
Court implemented the locality test in 1866 in The Plymouth by
5. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
6. Justice Frankfurter noted in Romero v. InternationalTerminal Operating
Co. that Article III impliedly (1) granted Congress authority to confer admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction on the tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court authorized by Article I, § 8, cl. 9; (2) empowered federal courts to continue development
of the admiralty and maritime law within constitutional limits, along with drawing on the substantive law inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;
and (3) empowered Congress to revise and supplement maritime law within the
limits of the Constitution. 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959). Justice Frankfurter noted
in Romero that this jurisdictional grant has remained unchanged in substance to
the present. 358 U.S. at 361. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
§ 1-9 at 18-19 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
7. "When the Constitution was adopted, the existing maritime law became
the law of the United States subject to power in Congress to modify or supplement
it as experience or changing conditions might require." Detroit Trust Co. v. The
Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 43 (1934). See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55
(1932).
8. The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 365 (1904).
9. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971).
10. Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1389, 13 Ric. 2, c. 5. See 1 E. SHIRAD & A.
SANN, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY (Jurisdiction) (7th ed. 1974) § 33, [hereinafter
cited as BENEDICT].
11. R. v. Keyn (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63, 46 L.J. (M.C.) 17, 13 Cox CC. 403; 1
BENEDICT, § 141, 9-2.
12. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, (No. 3776) (D. Mass. 1818). Purpose
proved determinative in the question of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts.
Admiralty jurisdiction extended to all contracts relating to the navigation, business, or commerce of the sea. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 1 (1870) (admiralty jurisdiction upheld over contract for insurance of ship);
GILMORE

& BLACK,

§ 1-10 at 22.
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upholding admiralty jurisdiction for "every species of tort...

whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable
...1 Salvage of downed aircraft at sea is allowed under
waters.
what is essentially a locality test.' The locality test has also been
followed in some modern admiralty cases.' 5 In Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines the locality test was used to uphold admiralty jurisdiction in cases arising from the crash of a commercial jet into Boston
Harbor while enroute from Boston to Philadelphia.'" But the locality test often led to curious results. A longshoreman knocked from
the pier into the water was held to be outside admiralty jurisdiction," but a longshoreman knocked from the deck of a vessel onto
the pier was held to be within the admiralty jurisdiction.'" Swimmers have been held entitled to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction.'9
Difficulties and confusion with the locality test"0 led to use of the
13. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35, 36 (1866), (wharf set afire by
sparks from burning ship, admiralty jurisdiction upheld).
14. H. HOTCHKISS, A TREATISE ON AVIATION LAW, 88 (2d ed., 1938); Lambros
Seaplane Base v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954); GILMORE & BLACK, §

8-3 at 540.
15. For modern cases using the locality test see, e.g., United States v. Matson
Nav. Co., 201 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1953) (admiralty action for damage to dike
in navigable river); London Guar. & Accident Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm., 279
U.S. 109, 123-24 (1929) (drowning in navigable, territorial waters of a state). See
1 BENEDICT, § 141 at 9-5.
16. 316 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1963). For a scathing criticism of the use of the
locality test for admiralty jurisdiction over air crashes, see GILMORE & BLACK, §
1-10 at 30-31.
17. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928). But see Interlake S.S. Co. v.
Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879, 882-83 (6th Cir. 1964) (admiralty jurisdiction upheld where
car driven off dock into Lake Erie, impetus of accident termed "land-based").
18. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935).
19. Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965)
(injury to swimmer by surfboard).
20. In De Lovio v. Boit, Justice Story said the locality-based jurisdiction
restrictions on the British Admiralty Court were not applicable to the colonies,
and that admiralty should encompass matters pertaining to the sea, not merely
things happening on the sea. 7 F. Cas. at 442. See GILMORE & BLACK, § 1-9 at 21.

Countless commentators have criticized the strict locality test. See, e.g., 7A J.
.325[31,
.325[5] (1972); Black, Admiralty
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
Jurisdiction;Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259, 264 (1950); Ingold,
TortsAlong the Water's Edge: Admiralty or Land Jurisdiction?,1968 U. ILL. L.F.
95 (1968); Comment, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1084 (1964).
The rigid locality test was weakened by extension of admiralty jurisdiction to
land used in aid of navigation in The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361 (1904) (ship
collision with lighthouse). For other erosions of the locality test, see, e.g., The
Gilbert Knapp, 37 F. 209 (E.D. Wis. 1889) (stevedore's contract claim within
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impact test, which held that torts occur not at their inception but
at the impact which gives rise to the cause of action.2 ' The determi-

nation of admiralty jurisdiction had occasionally been based on
maritime function or purpose,2 ' and in 1914 in Atlantic Transport
Company of West Virginia v. Imbrovek the Supreme Court verged
on requiring a sufficient relation to maritime function for admi-

ralty jurisdiction." a Sufficient relation of the tort to maritime service became a requirement (along with the locality requirement) in
the locality plus test. This test was used in Chapman v. City of
Grosse Pointe Farms to deny admiralty jurisdiction in the case of
a car driven from a pier into eighteen inches of water.2 4 Finally, in
Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., the Fifth Circuit
admiralty jurisdiction); Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 24 (1871)
(jurisdiction over marine insurance policy).
The Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970), provides jurisdiction for any damage caused by a vessel, whether on sea or land. This also provided
admiralty jurisdiction for torts committed by the shipowner during or before
unloading of the vessel where the impact was ashore at a time and place not
remote from the wrongful act. See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S.
206, 210 (1963) (injury caused by beans on dock, spilled during unloading). See
GILMORE & BLACK, § 1-10 at 23, n. 75; 338 F.2d at 882. Similarly, seamen are
entilted to maintenance and cure for injuries received in service of the vessel-whether on sea or land. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318
U.S. 36, 42 (1943).
21. Cases which employed the impact test to air crashes include Lavello v.
Danko, 175 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); and Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, Inc.,
121 F. Supp. 85, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1954). See 47 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1973); 26
ARK. L. REV. 390, 394 (1972); Dunn v. Wheeler Shipbuilding Corp., 86 F. Supp.
659, 660 (E.D. N.Y. 1949) (vessel manufacturing defects not operative for statute
of limitations purposes until time of capsizing). See also Gray v. American Radiator Co., 22 111. 2d. 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE,
§ 4, at 33 (1972).
22. In The Robert W. Parsons, the Supreme Court held "neither size, form,
equipment, nor means of propulsion are determinative factors upon the question
of jurisdiction, which regards only the purpose for which the craft was constructed, and the business in which it is engaged." 191 U.S. 17, 30 (1903). For

further discussion see Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 629 (1887);
Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co., 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903); Comment, 6 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 651 (1973); E. BENEDICT, THE AMERIcAN ADMIRALTY 173 (1850);
1 BENEDICT § 165, 10-10.
23. Justice Hughes wrote, "If more is required than the locality of the wrong
in order to give the court jurisdiction, the relation of the wrong to maritime
service, to navigation and to commerce on navigable waters, was quite sufficient."
234 U.S. 52, 62 (1914) (emphasis mine).
24. 385 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1967). Swaim, The Fifth Circuit 'Returned to
Navigation', 19 LoYoLA L. REv. 617 (1973); Executive Jet, 409 U.S. 251.
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abandoned the locality requirement altogether in the substantial
connection test. 25 In 1972 the Supreme Court finally tried to resolve
the jurisdictional questions that had lingered since Imbrovek. 21 In
Executive Jet, the aircraft ingested seagulls on takeoff for a landbased flight from Cleveland, Ohio to Portland, Maine. The jet
crashed within a fifth of a statute mile offshore.2 The Executive
Jet Court held that "fortuitous" maritime locality should not alone
be determinative of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 and refused jurisdic25. 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972). Factors to be considered for substantial
connection to maritime activities or interests include: (1) activities of the parties
at the time of the accident; (2) the relationship between the parties; (3) the
location where the injuries were sustained, and (4) the nature of the damage
sustained. 453 F.2d at 1127. "In other words, Judge Gewin retained the 'plus' but
abandoned the 'locality' of the locality plus test." Discussed by Swaim, supra
note 24 at 618-19.
Surprisingly enough, a similar test for admiralty jurisdiction had been used in
England as early as 1892. The Queen v. The Judge of the City of London Court,
[1892] 1 Q.B. 273. This decision held that all events on the high seas were not
within admiralty jurisdiction, and that the locality, the subject matter of the
complaint, and the person with whom the complaint was made should all be
considered. By this test, there would have been no admiralty jurisdiction if any
of these factors were missing. 1 Q.B. at 294-95. See also Campbell v. H. Hackfeld
& Co., 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903); 13 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 340, 344 (1974).
One commentator had accordingly advocated the same jurisdictional test for both
maritime torts and contracts. Pelaez, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction-The Last
Barrier,7 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, 43 (1968).
26. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. 249, 258. See Comment, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 171,
176 (1973); 234 U.S. at 61, note 23, supra.
27. 409 U.S. 249. In Executive Jet the Supreme Court refused admiralty jurisdiction in the case of a jet crash on a flight from Cleveland, Ohio, to Portland,
Maine. The Executive Jet Court, however, refrained from deciding whether an
aviation tort could ever have sufficient nexus with traditional maritime activity
for admiralty jurisdiction. "It could be argued, for instance, that if a plane flying
from New York to London crashed in the mid-Atlantic, there would be admiralty
jurisdiction over resulting tort claims even absent a specific statute. An aircraft
in that situation might be thought to bear a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity because it would be performing a function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels. . .

."

409 U.S. at 271.

28. 409 U.S. at 261. Disclaiming the strict locality test, the Executive Jet
Court noted, "The federal courts should not be burdened with every case of an
injured swimmer." Id., at 258. See also 1969 AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE STUDY OF
THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcrION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 233. But see

Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, note 19 supra. It is, of course, arguable that
the locality of the tort in Executive Jet was not really in Lake Erie. But see
discussion of the impact test for tort locality, text following note 19 supra; Com-

ment, 26 ARK. L. REv. 390, 394 (1972). The Executive Jet rejection of the mechanical locality test has been explained as based on the difficulties attributable to the
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tion over the crash because there was no significant relationship29
between the land-based flight and traditional maritime activity.
A two-step requirement of both maritime locality and maritime
nexus became the test for admiralty jurisdiction." The Executive
Jet holding was conservative and seemed to narrow admiralty jurisdiction. 1 The Executive Jet decision has since been cited as
black letter law in determining admiralty jurisdiction. 2 Furthermore, the Executive Jet locality plus test has been used to make
difficult and precise distinctions of admiralty jurisdiction. 3 But
inherent nature of aircraft; the inconsistency of the aviation industry's problems
with the history and purpose of admiralty; and the frustrating possibility that two
planes might collide in mid-air, with one falling in water and the other on land.
Comment, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. at 176.

29. 409 U.S. at 272-73. Authorities favoring such denial of jurisdiction include
7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE, Admiralty

.325[3], .325[5] (2d ed. 1972);

C. Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REV.
259, 264 (1950); Richards, Maritime Liens in Tort, GeneralAverage and Salvage,
47 TuL. L. REV. 569, 571 (1973). See also Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms,
note 24, supra.
30. "It is far more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty to
require also that the wrong [in the maritime locality] bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." 409 U.S. at 268 (emphasis added).
31.

See Comment, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 171, 176 (1973); Victory Carriers v. Law,

404 U.S. 202. Gilmore and Black state that Executive Jet overruled "to some not
yet certain extent" the cases giving jurisdiction over aircrashes into water.
GILMORE & BLAcK, 31. The Executive Jet holding itself was phrased only in terms
of "claims arising from airplane accidents." 409 U.S. at 268. The Executive Jet

test has, of course, been applied to a variety of claims. See note 34, infra.
32. See, e.g., Onley v. South CarolinaElec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758, 759 (4th
Cir. 1973); Rubin v. Power Authority of State of New York, 356 F. Supp. 1169
(W.D.N.Y. 1973). In Onley, the plaintiff dove from a dock into Lake Murray,
South Carolina, and was injured when he struck a submerged boat ramp. Defendant controlled the lakes's water level in connection with its generation of electric
power. The maritime nexus requirement was held unsatisfied. 488 F.2d at 759.
In Rubin, divers in the Niagra River for recreation and possible salvage were
drowned when they were drawn into the intakes of defendant's generating plant.
This, too, was held to constitute an insufficient maritime nexus. 356 F. Supp. at
1170. See also Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973) (suit by water skier
not properly in admiralty).
33. In Oppen v. Aetna Insurance Co., the Executive Jet decision was applied
to sustain a cause of action in maritime tort for a vessel's damages from contact
with an oil slick, while denying admiralty jurisdiction over plaintiff's loss of
navigation rights in the same incident. 485 F.2d 252, 253, 257 (9th Cir. 1973).
In 1974 the Fifth Circuit was confronted by a case involving explosion and fire
on an offshore oil platform which extended to a vessel moored to the platform. In
re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974). This disaster case
included suits on behalf of the platform operator's deceased supervisor against the
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application of the Executive Jet rule led to results of questionable
consistency,34 and the admiralty jurisdiction was characterized as
being in a state of "uncertainty."3 5 The Executive Jet holding has
been criticized for not presenting specific criteria for the "significant relationship to traditional maritime activities," 36 and proper
platform owner and platform operator for violation of safety regulations, along

with suits against the vessel owner for negligence and unseaworthiness. Id., at 269.
The Dearborn court used a locality plus maritime nexus analysis to sustain admiralty jurisdiction over the platform defendants. Id., at 276. The court held the
only maritime nexus as to the platform defendants was the deceased's presence
on the vessel. The admiralty interest was said to intervene in the action against
the vessel defendants, however, "because the risks to which Monk [the deceased] was exposed by [vessel defendant] Dearborn, and Dearborn's breaches
thereof, were admiralty-related, concerning the duty of the vessel to those aboard
her." See Compagnie General Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
The Executive Jet locality plus test has also been used to sustain admiralty
jurisdiction over the damage claim that resulted after a ship was struck by a
sidewinder missile released by a crashing United States Navy jet. T.J. Falgout
Boats Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974). The ship was in navigable waters when it was struck by the missile. The court noted the U.S. Navy exists
for the purpose of operating vessels in, on, and over navigable waters. Similarly,
the Court found that Navy aircraft, whether land-based or sea-based, function
in nautical operations. The court also found that the sidewinder missile created
a potential navigation hazard. Id., at 857.
The locality plus test was used to uphold admiralty jurisdiction over a pulp and
paper mill whose smoke caused a vessel to collide with a barge spanning the
Savannah River. In re Motor Ship Pacific Carrier, 489 F.2d 152, 153 (5th Cir.

1974) (smoke interfering unreasonably with the vessel's use of the waterway).
Locality plus has also been used to deny jurisdiction over a land-based helicopter
flight after refueling from an air-sea rescue. Teachey v. United States, 363 F.
Supp. 1197, 1198-99 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
34. See Comment, 4 GA. J. INT'L & Comrp. L. 232, 237 (1974). In Adams v.
Montana Power Co., 354 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mon. 1973), the traditional maritime
activity nexus was found lacking in a boating accident on navigable river waters
between two dams. This was "locality plus" with a vengeance. But, in Luna v.
Starof India, 356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973), admiralty jurisdiction was allowed
in an action for injury aboard a restored merchant vessel. The Star of India was
essentially a floating museum in North San Diego Bay, not having seen actual
maritime use since 1923. In Carroll v. ProtectionMaritime Insurance Co., Ltd.,
the maritime nexus test was even employed to sustain admiralty jurisdiction over
an alleged conspiracy in restraint of trade. Seamen and commercial fishermen
who had previously brought personal injury actions against their employers
claimed loss of work due to "listing" by the insurance carrier defendants. 512 F.2d
4 (1st Cir. 1975).
35. Comment, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L., at 237.
36. Neal & Connolly, Admiralty Jurisdiction:Executive Jet in Historical
Perspective, 34 OHIO STATE L. J. 355, 369 (1973).
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interpretation of Executive Jet has indeed proved difficult. As

Circuit Judge Morgan noted in dissent in Kelly v. Smith, "Everyone agrees that 'locality plus' is the test in this case but we are
still faced with the question, 'locality plus what'?" 37 The Fifth
Circuit had attempted to answer that question in the Kelly case,
which involved injuries that resulted when hunters fired on38
poachers who were fleeing by outboard on the Mississippi River.
The court held that factors for consideration in determining
admiralty jurisdiction include: (1) the functions and roles of
the parties; (2) the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; (3) the causation and type of injury; and (4) traditional
concepts of the role of admiralty law.3 Morgan advocated analysis
of the conflicting interests of state and federal law as another criterion.4" Kelly v. Smith has, however, been sharply criticized as a
return to the strict locality test." Still other tests for admiralty
37. 485 F.2d 520, 527 (1973). Proper interpretation of Executive Jet has been
termed the "thorniest problem" faced by the Fifth Circuit in 1973. Chamlee,
Admiralty, 25 MERCER L. REv. 787, 790.
38. 485 F.2d at 521.
39. 485 F.2d at 525. The analysis of Kelly has aided other determinations of
admiralty jurisdiction. See In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation, 381 F. Supp.
931, 943 (S.D.W. Va. 1974) (no admiralty jurisdiction over collapse of highway
bridge onto Ohio River); St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 978-79 (8th

Cir. 1974) (admiralty jurisdiction over accident involving pleasure craft in navigable waters); Neal & Connolly, supra note 36, at 371, 372.
40. 485 F.2d at 526 et seq. This evaluative weighing of state and federal
interests is discussed in Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51
CAL. L. REv. 661, 702 (1963).
National interests include the need for a uniform system to foster maritime
commerce by precluding local discriminatory practices and providing a single
system of law upon which foreign traders can rely. See Southern Pac. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205 (1917). The national interest also includes resolving disputes in
admiralty beyond state boundaries.
State interests include the state's desire to apply local law to controversies
within the state's boundaries and to controversies involving the state's citizens.
See Victory Carriers v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971). Despite federal supremacy in
admiralty, the prevalent attitude of "scrupulous confining" of the federal jurisdiction makes such a balancing of state and federal interests possible. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 272-73; Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934); 404 U.S. at
212; Neal & Connolly, supra note 36, at 374; Chamlee, supra note 37, at 933.
41. Swaim, supranote 24, at 636 (1973). Swaim views the Executive Jet Court
as misunderstanding and corrupting the Peytavin substantial connection test,
which requires no maritime locality for admiralty jurisdiction. Id., at 620, note
18. Kelly's "locality test" is therefore a corruption of Executive Jet and a further
perversion of Peytavin. Id., at 638.
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jurisdiction have been suggested.42 Jurisdictional decisions over
aviation torts have been particularly divergent. Admiralty jurisdiction was upheld over the mid-air collision of two planes being
used to spot schools of fish in the Gulf of Mexico in Hornsby v. Fish
Meal Co.," but in early 1975 in American Home Assurance Co. v.
United States the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied admiralty jurisdiction over the crash of an aircraft en route from Atlantic City, New Jersey to Block Island, New York." The need for
further clarification of the scope of admiralty jurisdiction was obvious.
The uncertainty that followed Executive Jet was faced by the
court in the instant case. The court noted that the Supreme Court
in Executive Jet expressly avoided deciding whether aviation torts
could ever satisfy the nexus test for traditional maritime activity."
"The issue left open by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet is thus
42. Stolz, supra note 40, at 661. Stolz finds admiralty jurisdiction to be based
on connection with commercial activity, with the commercial connection deter-

minative

of the federal-state interest inquiry. Stolz, supra note 40, at 661. "Cer-

tainly there can be no reason for admiralty power over a public tide-water which
does not apply with equal force to any other public water used for commercial
purposes and foreign trade." The Genessee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457
(1852) ("upholding" the Great Lakes Act of 1845, 5 Stat. 726). See The Mamie,
5 F. 813, 819 (E.D. Mich. 1881). For further support, Stolz notes that there
apparently is no imputed negligence rule in admiralty, which "is scarcely surprising, for the 'family purpose' doctrine is meaningless in a commercial context."
Stolz, supra note 40, at 717. "The Supreme Court has occasionally flirted with
the notion that the proper ambit of admiralty law is circumscribed by what is of
concern to commerce." Id. at 665. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558
(1874); Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52. But see St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d
at 978-79. In any event, Stolz notes, "where the needs of commerce cease, the need
for applying federal law ought also to end." Stolz, supra note 40.
Benedict, on the other hand, calls for a "significant relationship to shipping and
navigation" for admiralty jurisdiction in the "secondary locale" of inland navigable waters, while requiring no more than maritime locality in the "primary locale"
of the high seas. 1 BENEDICT § 141, 9-5.
43. 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970). One plane crashed within a maritime league
of the Louisiana shore. But admiralty jurisdiction was upheld because the aircraft
was enacting a function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels. Hornsby
v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d at 866. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 271. Admiralty
jurisdiction was also upheld over the crash in navigable waters of a cargo plane
bound from Los Angeles to Okinawa in Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520,
526 (9th Cir. 1974) (crash 1,500-1,900 feet shy of the runway, outside the coverage
of DOHSA).
44. 389 F. Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1975). See note 52 infra.
45. 398 F. Supp. at 832-33. Seeq409 U.S. at 271.
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squarely before this court."4 The Court, however, had already
cited Executive Jet to discard the locality test, holding the parties'
stipulation of locality insufficient to establish admiralty jurisdiction. The court found "implicit approval" by the Executive Jet
Court for aviation personal injury suits in admiralty under the
Death on the High Seas Act (DOSHA), even though such a remedy
is not provided by DOSHA or other statutes. The district court
found language in Executive Jet concerning possible admiralty

jurisdiction over a trans-Atlantic flight "helpful," but not "dispo-

sitive."47 The court then upheld admiralty jurisdiction in the instant case, relying on a purpose determinative test drawn from
language in Executive Jet: "What is central to this question, under
Executive Jet, is not the situs of the crash, but rather the nature
of the flight itself . . . [This flight] was serving a function that
had traditionally been carried on by surface-going maritime vessels." 48 The fact that defendant's jet crashed into Greek domestic

waters during what was essentially a Greek domestic flight was
held not to upset the admiralty jurisdiction.49 The court noted in

support of this finding that "the uniform applicability of the rules
of admiralty in various jurisdictions is the foundation of their use-

fulness."

0

46. 398 F. Supp. at 833.
47. 398 F. Supp. at 834.
48. 398 F. Supp. at 834. A similar purpose determinative test was used in
Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970) (aircraft re-enacting
function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels). See also The General
Cass, 1 Brown Adm. 334, 10 F. Cas. (No. 5), 307: "the true criterion by which to
determine whether any water craft, or vessel, is subject to admiralty jurisdiction,
is the business or employment for which it is intended, or is susceptible of being
used, or in which it is actually engaged, rather than its size, form, capacity, or
means of propulsion." See 1 BENEDICT, § 164, and the list at 10-11 through 10-16
of over fifty various instrumentalities and vehicles which have qualified in admiralty jurisdiction. But see American Home Assurance Co. v. United States, 389
F. Supp. 657, 658 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (no admiralty jurisdiction over flight to Block
Island).
49. 398 F. Supp. at 834. The court seems to be minimizing the jurisdictional
importance of locality. See note 25 supra; Peytavin, 453 F.2d 1121; Carroll v.
Protection Marit. Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4, 5 (1975). Judge Richey noted, "The defendant's jetliner in the instant case was engaged in what may be viewed as a Greek
domestic flight, although the flight occurred almost entirely over international
waters. Even so, this consideration has little relevance to the question of whether
an action for the wrongful death of an American citizen resulting from the crash
of such an aircraft can be said to be within the maritime jurisdiction of a United
States federal court." 398 F. Supp. at 834.
50. 398 F. Supp. at 834, n.6. Judge Richey also points out that litigants would
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The Executive Jet holding posed the question whether an aviation tort can ever satisfy the maritime nexus requirement.51 Commentators and courts have tried to face this hypothetical of admiralty jurisdiction, with varying conclusions. Holdings consistent
with the purpose determinative language of Hammill had been
rendered in Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co. and Roberts v. United
States.52 But the denial of admiralty jurisdiction in American
Home Assurance" was a direct contradiction of the purpose determinative test in a jurisdictional setting virtually identical to
Hammill.11 It is time for the Supreme Court to once again answer
its own question, and clarify the proper scope of admiralty jurisdiction in cases of aviation tort. For now, however, the "state of uncertainty" persists for the applicability of admiralty jurisdiction to
maritime torts. Commentators have distinguished ships from airface choice-of-law, choice-of-forum, and other problems if there were no uniform
applicability of the rules of admiralty. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 506; note
26 supra. Commentators have noted that remedies and protections should be the
same on both intra- and inter-continental flights. Comment, 4 J. MARrr. L. &
COM. 637 (1973); 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 658-59 (1973).

51. 409 U.S. at 271.
52. "Geographic realities, therefore, do not make the cargo plane's contact
with navigable waters entirely 'fortuitious.' More significantly, the transoceanic
transportation of cargo is an activity which is readily analogized with 'traditional

maritime activity.' Indeed, before the advent of aviation, such shipping could

only be performed by waterborne vessels." Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d at
524. See also T. J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d at 857, and note
33 supra (purpose determinative language applied to navy jets and missiles);
Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. at 687 (seaplane found to have taken
over function of waterborne vessels in transit between St. Thomas and St. Croix).
53. But see Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., note 52 supra. In American Home
Assurance, the District Court held: "The drift of the Executive Jet opinion is that
the Supreme Court has serious doubts as to whether airplane accidents are proper
subjects of admiralty suits. Thus, the Court does not feel that the fact that Block
Island was separated from the mainland is sufficient alone to distinguish this case
from Executive Jet. . . ." 389 F. Supp. at 658. See also Comment, 4 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. at 236, "This [the Executive Jet hypothetical] then raises the problem of what constitutes a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity
where aviation is concerned. The Court seems to be saying that there is none."
See 7A J. Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 30[5] at 3771-72.
In American Home Assurance the flight seems to have been exclusively over
domestic waters, and this might allow Hammill to be distinguished. But the
uniform applicability of admiralty jurisdiction in Hammill was not disturbed by
the domestic waters locality of the crash. 398 F. Supp. at 834. See note 50 supra.
Hammill and American Home Assurance are in direct contradiction, especially
in view of Hammill's policy of uniform applicability of admiralty.
54. 389 F. Supp. at 658. The island was only accessible by air or by sea.
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foretelling the dangers of applying

admiralty jurisdiction to aviation torts. The commentators were
seemingly joined by the Supreme Court itself in calling for a Congressional answer to the riddle of Executive Jet." Such legislation
could obviously be the most precise, definite, and comprehensive
solution to the problem. But in the absence of legislation, admiralty jurisdiction should include aviation torts that qualify under
the purpose determinative test. Denial of jurisdiction merely because air travel is involved seems a bizarre step to the past and the
locality test. Case law interpretations of'DOSHA provide an analogy in support of inclusion of aviation torts in admiralty jurisdiction." In D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways the Second
Circuit held:
The statutory expression 'on the high seas' should be capable of
55. "Ships, by their very nature, are relegated solely to the seas and to the
great inland lakes and waterways of the world. The shores of these waters form
boundaries, beyond which they cannot operate. Airplanes, on the other hand, are
not limited by any such physical boundaries and can and do operate over both
land and navigable bodies of water. Thus application of a system of laws geared
only to commerce and navigation upon navigable waters will of necessity cause
meaningless distinctions if applied to aircraft unhindered by such geographical
boundaries." 7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

30[5] at 3771-72. See Executive

Jet, 409 U.S. at 266. The Executive Jet Court noted that in contexts besides tort,
the Congress and courts have exempted aircraft from the maritime law because

of the uniqueness of air travel. 409 U.S. at 269-70; the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (1970), successor to the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44
Stat. 572. See note 56 infra. See also 34 OHIO STATE L. REV. at 371.
56. "If federal uniformity is the desired goal with respect to claims arising
from aviation accidents, Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to enact
legislation applicable to all such accidents, whether occurring on land or water,
and adapted to the specific characteristics of air commerce." Executive Jet, 409
U.S. at 274. This "invitation" has been termed "appropriate." 6 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. at 659. The commentators have likewise urged uniform legal protection for both intra- and inter-continental aviation torts. Comment, 4 J. MARIT.
L. & COM. at 643; Comment, 6 VAND. J. TRANSANT'L L. at 658, 659. Similarly,

Moore advocates that "just as the admiralty has, from ancient times, been found
in need of special legal principles and procedures especially suited to its peculiarities, so too should air commerce be guided by a set of rules and principles especially adapted to the specific problems it creates." 7A J. Moore, at 3775-76. See
Comment, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. at 175; Sweeney, Is SpecialAviationLiability Legislation Essential? 19 J. Am L. & COM. 166 (1952); Comment, 55 COLUm. L. Rnv.
907, 922 (1955); 4 J. MARrr. L. & CoM. at 644.
57. See 316 F.2d at 763. DOHSA was first passed in 1920, when the only
feasible way to go "beyond a marine league from shore" and qualify for DOHSA
jurisdiction was by ship.
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expansion to, under, or over, as scientific advances change the
methods of travel. The law would indeed be static if a passenger on
a ship were protected by the Act and another passenger in the identical location three thousand feet above in a plane were not.58

The D'Aleman reasoning has accordingly been used to uphold
admiralty jurisdiction for a trans-Atlantic air tort involving no
contact with the water. 9 Furthermore, federal courts have

extended beyond DOSHA to grant admiralty jurisdiction over personal injury actions arising from aircraft accidents over the high
seas in crashes over one marine league from shore.60 The Hammill
58. 259 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1958). This equating of voyagers on and above
the ocean is within the ambit of Hammill's purpose determinative test. The
Southern District of New York held, "The statute certainly includes the phrase
'on the high seas' but there is no reason why this should make the law operable
only on a horizontal plane. The very next phrase 'beyond a marine league from
the shore of any state' may be said to include a vertical sense and another dimension." Choy v. Pan American World Airways, 1941 A.M.C. 483, 484 (S.D.N.Y.).
See Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874, 875-76 (W.D. Pa.
1965).
Indeed, during aviation's developing years in the United States, "There was a
considerable body of opinion that the entire ocean of air surrounding the earth is
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal government." Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 91, note 23 (N.D. Cal. 1954). This
approach is also supported by the common law property doctrine of Cujus Est
Solum Ejus Est Usque Ad Coelum, which holds that exclusive rights are maintained infinitely upward. 244 F. Supp. at 876. But see City of Newark v. Eastern
Air Lines, 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958). Cujus Est has not been applied in
modem times concerning land rights, but the nature and needs of civilization on
land can distinguish this land practice from the high seas.
59. Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, 244 F. Supp. at 874-75. In Notarian, a
passenger was injured when the plane jolted violently while traversing the Atlantic Ocean on a flight from Pittsburg to Rome with a New York stopover. See
Horton v. J. & J. Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
Crimes committed on aircraft flying over international waters were originally
not punishable under criminal statutes proscribing acts committed on the high
seas. See United States v. Peoples, 50 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Cal. 1943); United
States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). This policy was changed by
Congress to include crimes on aircraft in flight over the high seas or other waters
in the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, excluding waters in any state's
jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1970). See Executive Jet, 409 U.S., at 262. See also
note 40 supra.
60. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 264; Bergeron v. Aero Associates, Inc., 213
F. Supp. 936 (E.D. La. 1963); 244 F. Supp. 874; Horton, 257 F. Supp. 120.
Obviously, DOHSA technically would not cover such claims. See also Weinstein
v. Eastern Airlines, 316 F.2d 765. The Weinstein Court noted that to deny admiralty jurisdiction over an air crash just within the one marine league of shore
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purpose determinative test gains strong support from the broad
applicability of the admiralty forum through DOSHA. Furthermore, the differences between nautical and aviation torts for pur-

poses of litigation have probably been exaggerated.6 ' In sustaining
admiralty jurisdiction in Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., the court
based its holding in part on the fundamental similarities between
aircraft accidents and marine accidents."2 Admiralty jurisdiction

has a history of broad and, ideally, uniform application in the
United States.6 3 If the admiralty is to remain a viable body of law,
"would be to impose an illogical and irrational distinction on the operation of the
broad grant of admiralty jurisdiction extended by the Constitution and implemented by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333." Although Weinstein upheld the locality test, its
argument for broad applicability of admiralty jurisdiction (especially on both
sides of the one marine league from shore line) was quite proper.
61. See notes 55 and 56 supra.
62. 355 F. Supp. at 686-87. Hark involved the crash of a seaplane during flight
from St. Thomas Island to St. Croix Island in the Virgin Islands. Although the
flight itself was not international, the plane flew over international high seas.
The court called for treating aircraft and marine accidents similarly because
both aviation and marine law deal with complex mechanisms. It noted that
"airworthiness" and "seaworthiness" are not dissimilar, and that there is a certain kinship between admiralty's Rules of the Road and the aviation doctrine of
last clear chance. The court decided that as a matter of policy, aviation torts
should not be confined by a brief and unyielding statute of limitations, greater
flexibility ii needed because both aviation and maritime accidents are more complicated than ordinary torts, typically requiring lengthy official inquiry. 355 F.
Supp. at 687.
The court also focused on the convenience of applying the uniform admiralty
laws to a tort occurring beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands.
355 F. Supp. at 687. See note 25 supra. An additional basis was the peculiarly
and necessarily maritime nature of a seaplane at takeoff and landing. 355 F.
Supp. at 686.
63. As noted by Circuit Justice Story, "At all events, there is no solid reason
for constituting the terms of the Constitution in a narrow and limited sense, or
for ingrafting upon them the restriction of English Statutes, or decisions at common law founded on those statutes, which were sometimes dictated by jealousy,
and sometimes by misapprehension, which are often contradictory, and rarely
supported by any consistent principle. The advantages resulting to the commerce

and navigation of the United States, from uniformity of rules and decisions in all
maritime questions, authorizes us to believe that national policy, as well as
juridical logic, require the clause of the Constitution to be so construed, as to
" De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F.
embrace all maritime contracts, torts and injuries. . . ...

Cas. 418, 443 (No. 3775) (D. Mass. 1815). See also The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909
(No. 12,578) (C.C.D. Md. 1865): "Certainly it better becomes the humane and
liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy,
when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules," quoted in
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 583 (1974).
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it must adapt to the innovations and evolutions of transportation."
This adaptiveness bodes well for the purpose determinative test.
Robert Boak Slocum
64.

"In facing these and other new problems, the [Admiralty] Court will

apply a Law which, however ancient, has demonstrated its flexibility and adaptability to change. . . ... F. WIswALL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
AND PRACTICE SINCE 1800, 154 (1970). Wiswall considers the accommodation by
Great Britain's admiralty laws to aircraft and hovercraft. Similarly, the Supreme
Court noted, "These [maritime concerns] may require that former criteria of
jurisdiction be abandoned, as, for example, they were abandoned in discarding
the doctrine that the admiralty jurisdiction was limited to tidewaters." Detroit
Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 52 (1934).

ADMIRALTY-MASTER

OF A VESSEL HAS A

DUTY

TO SEARCH AND

ATTEMPT A RESCUE WHEN HE KNOWS OR IN THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE CARE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN A SEAMAN IS MISSING

Plaintiff administratrix brought this action against defendant
shipowner to recover for a seaman's wrongful death.' The seaman, Joseph Abbott, had been chief engineer on a vessel owned
by defendant and had been summoned to the engine room to repair machinery. Decedent never appeared in the engine room, and
no immediate attempt was made to determine his whereabouts.'
Some three hours later, decedent's absence was noted, and the
master ordered a search of the vessel. When the search proved
unsuccessful, the master commenced rescue efforts on the assumption that decedent had fallen overboard.3 Decedent was never
found and was presumed drowned. Plaintiff alleged that the master was negligent in failing to note decedent's absence and to institute timely rescue efforts.4 Defendant did not dispute the facts as
1. United States Lines was the owner and operator of the ship Pioneer
Contender on which decedent seaman served as chief engineer. Suit was brought
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) and the Death on the High Seas Act,
46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970), both of which require proof of negligence. The provisions of the Death on the High Seas Act do not differ significantly from those of
the Jones Act as applied to the issues in the instant case. See M. NORRIs, THE
LAW OF SEAMEN § 654 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NORRIS]. For the applicable
provisions of the Jones Act see note 7 infra.
2. The ship was cruising on the high seas when, at approximately 5:00 a.m.,

a broken pump caused the engines to be shut down. The officer on duty in the
engine room notified Abbott, the master, and the first assistant engineer of the
problem. Abbott was asleep in his cabin at the time, but when awakened by the
messenger, Abbott indicated he would go down to the engine room. Within ten
minutes, the first assistant engineer reached the engine room and repaired the
pump, whereupon the engines were restarted. Abbott v. United States Lines, 512
F.2d 118, 119 (4th Cir. 1975).
3. When Abbott did not appear for breakfast at approximately 8:00 a.m., the
master ordered a search of the ship. The search having proven unsuccessful, at
8:30 a.m., the master broadcast a "man overboard" message, posted lookouts,
and sailed the vessel back along its track to its approximate position at 5:00 a.m.
Abbott was not found. At 1:00 p.m. the vessel gave up the search and continued
the voyage.
4. Plaintiff, Mrs. Abbott, presented testimony to the effect that Abbott's
failure to appear in the engine room after having been notified of the trouble was
sufficiently remarkable that the master was negligent for not having made an
immediate effort to locate him. She presented further testimony tending to show
that Abbott's chances of survival would have been significantly increased had
search and rescue efforts begun shortly after 5:00 a.m. Defendant did not dispute
the facts as presented by plaintiff, but did present evidence which indicated that
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presented by plaintiff, but denied negligence. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found in favor
of defendant shipowner, ruling that the master has no duty to
rescue until he knows that a seaman has fallen overboard. 5 On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held, reversed and remanded for a new trial. The master has
a duty to rescue when he knows or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known that a seaman is missing. Abbott v. United
States Lines, 512 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1975).
The master of a vessel has a general responsibility for the care
and safety of his crew while they are aboard ship.' This implies a
duty on the part of the master to exercise due diligence to protect
a seaman from avoidable peril, and to provide assistance should a
seaman be threatened by injury or death.' When a seaman falls
Abbott's failure to appear was not so unusual that the master should have been
concerned.
5. Therefore, the actions of the master and crew before that discovery were
not necessarily negligent. The court submitted to the jury only the question of
defendant's negligence after Abbott was discovered missing at 8:00 a.m. The jury
found for defendant.
6. See, e.g., The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240 (1903) (master has duty to provide
adequate care for injured seaman, even if seaman does not request it); Mathews
v. Halford, 374 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1974)
(recognizing that the master has a very high duty of care to his crew, although
that duty was not breached on the facts); Pedersen v. Diesel Tankers, Ira S.
Sushey, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (master breached duty of care by

failing to adequately instruct seaman in the use of dangerous equipment). It has
been said that the master stands in loco parentisto his crew and thus has paternal
responsibilities to them. NORRIS § 535.
7. While this duty has always existed, under general maritime law the master
(or owner) was not liable to the seaman for compensatory damages for its negligent breach, the seaman's recovery being for maintenance and cure and for unseaworthiness. NORRIS § 657. The seaman's right to compensatory damages was
created by the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The Act incorporates by reference the provisions of the Federal Employees Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §
51 et seq. (1970), thus making the shipowner liable to the seaman for damages
resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of the shipowner's agents or from
any defect, due to negligence, in the vessel's equipment. As in actions at common
law, a seaman suing to recover in a negligence action under the Jones Act must
show "the existence of a duty, the negligent violation of this duty by the employer, and . . . a causal relationship of the violation to the injury sustained."
NORRIS § 690, at 377. The criteria for establishing the existence of a duty and its

negligent violation are much the same as in common law. The standard of causation under the Jones Act is quite different from that at common law, being taken
from § 51 of the FELA. This section makes the employer liable for all injuries
resulting in whole or in part from his negligence. Contributory negligence on the
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overboard, the master's general responsibility for the safety of his
crew crystallizes into a specific duty to rescue. This duty is well
recognized, and as a result the issue rarely presents itself to the
appellate courts.' Prior to 1962, the leading case in the area was
Harrisv. Pennsylvania RailroadCo.,' which recognized an implied
contractual duty on the part of the master to use every reasonable
means to save a seaman who has fallen overboard.'" In 1962, the
same standard was cogently restated in Gardnerv. National Bulk
Carriers," which has tended to serve as a guide for subsequent
decisions. 12 The issue usually before the court is whether a given
action by the master is sufficient to discharge that duty. As the
court said in Gardner, the duty involved is less than a duty to
effect a rescue, but it does demand a sincere attempt at rescue.' 3
Thus, the response required of a master when a seaman is lost
part of the seaman is not a defense, but merely serves to reduce the recovery to
the extent that such negligence contributed to the injury. FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 53.

8. An early case was United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800 (No. 15540)
(N.D. Cal. 1864), which said there could be criminal liability for a failure to
rescue. Justice Cardozo recognized the duty in Cortes v. BaltimoreInsularLines,

287 U.S. 367, 377 (1932). See, e.g., Di Nicola v. Pennsylvania R.R., 158 F.2d 856
(2d Cir. 1946) (master has duty to rescue; whether he used all reasonable means
is for the jury); Petition of Trans-Pacific Fishing and Packing Co., 152 F. Supp.
44 (W.D. Wash. 1957) (failure to make any attempt at rescue imposes liability).

For a discussion of the history of the rescue doctrine see Bentley, Shipowner's
Responsibility for Rescue at Sea, 3 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 573 (1972).
9. 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931).
10. In Harris,defendant contended there was no duty to rescue a seaman who
falls overboard as a result of his own negligence or misfortune, and not as a result
of the negligence of the shipowner or a fellow crewman, by analogy to the law of
master and servant. The court said that, regardless of the state of the law with
respect to nonmaritime occupations, the peculiar dependence of the seaman imposes on his employer an "exceptional obligation to care for the well-being of the
crew" which is evidenced by the responsibility of the employer to provide maintenance and cure for an injured seaman. The court then went on to say that "it was
absurd to admit the duty to extend aid in the lesser emergency [injury], and to
deny it in the greater [rescue]." 50 F.2d at 868.
11. 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913, rehearingdenied,
372 U.S. 961 (1963).
12. The court in Gardner held:
The survival of a seaman adrift at sea depends in large measure on the
diligence of those who are required by law to look after him. If they default
in their duty, death is made certain. In recognition of this unyielding truth,
the admiralty law annexes to a seaman's contract of employment an obligation on the part of the master to use every reasonable means to save the
seaman's life if he goes overboard. 310 F.2d at 286.
13. 310 F.2d at 287.
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overboard will vary with the circumstances. In some situations, as
when the ship itself is in peril or a rescue attempt is physically
impossible, the master may be required to do very little. For example, in Kiesel v. American Trading," a seaman fell overboard while
his vessel was proceeding down a narrow river channel, where it
would have been extremely dangerous for the ship to have attempted to reverse course, as there was a substantial risk that it
would have run aground and blocked the channel. The court ruled
that in this situation it was reasonable for the master to do nothing
more than notify the United States Coast Guard. However, since
the seaman's life is at stake, such cases are the exceptions. Thus,
the courts have consistently held that the master must exercise the
highest degree of care when the safety of the crew is involved and,
in particular, that the master must take every reasonable means
to rescue a seaman even when the possibility of success is remote.'"
Illustrating the extent of this requirement, the court in Gardnerv.
5 found the master negligent in failing to
National Bulk Carriers"
search for a crewman who had fallen overboard at an undetermined time up to five and one-half hours before he was first
missed. The required search would have entailed retracing the
vessel's path over some 100 miles of open ocean. While recognizing
the duty to rescue, prior to the instant case the courts had not
addressed the precise issue of when the duty to rescue arose. The
duty obviously existed once the master obtained certain knowledge
that a seaman was lost overboard, but whether it existed before
that time was an open question.
In the instant case, the district court had relied in part on ambiguous language in Gardner,'7 which the court interpreted to
mean that the duty to rescue arises only when the absence of a
14. 347 F. Supp. 673 (D. Md. 1972).
15. One reason for this insistance may be that, under certain circumstances,
seamen have been known to survive for several days in the water. In one instance,
a seaman was rescued after having been adrift for 56 hours. See Petition of TransPacific Fishing and Packing Co., 152 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Wash. 1957) (master
should have attempted rescue, even if it involved some danger to the ship).
16. 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913, rehearingdenied,
372 U.S. 961 (1963). Gardner is significant for its treatment of proximate cause
in rescue cases, as well as for its articulation of the rescue doctrine. For a discussion of Gardner see Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1023 (1963); Kelsey, Shipowner's Duty
to Rescue Crewmen-The Gardner Case, 49 VA. L. Rav. 492 (1963); Note, 18
HASTINGS L.J. 981 (1967).
17. 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913, rehearing denied,

372 U.S. 961 (1963).
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seaman is discovered.1 8 The court of appeals disagreed with this
interpretation, saying that, while this precise issue was not before
the Gardnercourt, that decision does not suggest that the absence
of a seaman may be disregarded. The court then stated that, since
the rescue doctrine is based on the law of negligence, the master's
duty under the doctrine is tested by the standard of reasonable
care. Therefore, the court held that "if there is a reasonable possibility of rescue, the ship is under a duty to search and attempt a
rescue when the officers know or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known a seaman is missing."' 9 Since the issue of
whether that duty was breached on the instant facts was properly
a jury question, the court remanded the case for determination of
whether the failure to discover decedent's absence was attributable
to the negligence of the vessel's officers.

This case is the first to state explicitly that a master may be
deemed negligent for failing to note the absence of a seaman when
that failure prevents timely rescue efforts. Prior cases dealt with
the adequacy of the master's response after having obtained certain knowledge that a crewman was missing, not with the possibly
negligent conduct which prevented him from obtaining such
knowledge. The novelty of the instant holding, however, results
more from the relative rarity of the fact situation involved than
from any departure from established law. Given the structured
nature of the shipboard life, the cases in which a seaman is missing
under circumstances that imply some notice to the master, but
which are not remarkable enough to cause even the most "negligent" master to take action, should be few. Once the situation did
occur in Abbott, the court's holding followed from a straightforward application of the "known or should have known" standard of negligence 20 to the unquestioned duty of the ship to aid
a seaman lost overboard. Hence, the master had a duty to take
effective measures to rescue decedent, and since the measures
taken were less effective than they might have been had decedent's
absence been noted sooner, that omission may have been negligent
18. The language on which the district court apparently relied is: "[t]he duty
to rescue arises when there is a reasonable possibility of rescue." 310 F.2d at 286.
19. 512 F.2d at 121.
20. This standard frequently has been applied to actions under the Jones Act.
See, e.g., Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transport, 141 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944) (master
knew or should have known that a violent seaman posed a danger to a crewmate);
Vareltzis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 258 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1944) (mate knew or should
have known of hazard created by icy condition of deck).
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and may have contributed to Abbott's death. Both questions are
for the jury to decide. Much of the confusion in this case seems to
have resulted from the trial court's initial approach to the case as
a rescue action. A certain amount of mental gymnastics is required
to derive from the general rescue doctrine a duty to search before
the absence of a seaman is discovered. The reasoning is much
clearer if the problem is approached from the point of view of the
master's general responsibility for the care and safety of his crew,
which is quite as well established as the duty to rescue.2' This
responsibility necessarily includes a duty on the part of the master
to investigate when a seaman is absent under unusual circumstances, since such absence could indicate that the seaman is in extreme danger. It is logical to characterize the master's failure to

note decedent's absence as a possible negligent breach of that
duty-a breach which prevented the commencement of rescue efforts within minutes after Abbott fell overboard, 22 while there was
still an excellent chance of success, and thus conceivably contributed to his death. This analysis provides a clearer basis for the
submission of the question of the master's negligence to the jury,
and avoids the issues associated with the duty to rescue that the
trial court found troublesome.
Edward D. Meyer
21. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
22. Assuming, as the court appears to have done, that Abbott fell overboard
on the way from his cabin to the engine room.

ALIENS RIGHTS-INDIGENT ALIEN HAS QUALIFIED RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL AT DEPORTATION HEARING

Petitioner, an indigent native and citizen of Mexico, had been a
permanent resident of the United States since 1967. In 1971, on his

return from a vacation in Mexico, petitioner was searched and
subsequently arrested by United States customs officers at the
Mexican border for possessing two grams of cocaine. Petitioner
plead guilty to one count of knowingly possessing a quantity of
cocaine.' He was fined $3,000 and placed on five years probation.

Neither petitioner's appointed counsel nor the district court informed him that a narcotics conviction would almost certainly

result in his deportation. 2 Subsequently, the Immigration and Nat-

uralization Service (INS) issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing charging that because of his conviction petitioner
should be deported under section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act.' Petitioner then appeared before the immi1.

Cocaine is a schedule II controlled substance under 21 U.S.C.

844(a)(1970). Section 844(a) provides that:

§

It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a
controlled substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, from a practitioner, while acting in
the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by
this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter.
2. See Wexler, The Alien CriminalDefendant: An Examination of Immigration Law Principlesfor CriminalLaw Practices,10 CRIM. L. BULL. 289 (1974). The
article focuses its principal attention on three cases: United States v. Parrino, 212
F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954) (erroneous advice of counsel
not reversible error); Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968) (no deprivation of effective counsel); United
States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (erroneous advice of counsel not
reversible error). It is noted that despite the resulting harshness, the courts have
rather consistently held that vulnerability to deportation is a "collateral" rather
than a "direct" consequence of a guilty plea, and that courts accepting guilty
pleas need not affirmatively inform alien defendants of the collateral consequences of deportation in order to satisfy Rule 11 or voluntariness requirements.
Even clearly erroneous advice by counsel is insufficient cause for relief unless the
counsel's incompetence meets the "mockery test." However, erroneous advice
from the prosecution or the bench may warrant relief. See United States v.
Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (no significant government involvement
in alien's decision to enter a guilty plea); Briscoe v. United States, 391 F.2d 984
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (new trial ordered on voluntariness of alien's plea due to erroneous belief that so doing would make deportation available to him).
3. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Immigration and Nationality Act]. Section 241(a)(11) provides:
(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall,
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gration judge and requested appointed counsel. This request was
denied. After a hearing, petitioner was ordered deported and was
denied the option of voluntary departure. Shortly thereafter, petitioner obtained local counsel4 and filed an appeal with the Board
of Immigration Appeals challenging the validity of his Texas conviction. Petitioner's Texas counsel then filed a motion to withdraw
the guilty plea 5 asserting that the District Court had not conformed with federal evidentiary rules in accepting the plea because
(1) it had not properly determined that there was a factual basis
for the plea; and (2) the plea had been made without a full understanding of the possible consequences.' The Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioner then appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit arguing that
an indigent alien has the right to appointed counsel in a deportation proceeding and that any statute seemingly denying this right
is unconstitutional.7 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held affirmed. While an indigent alien has a qualified
right to be represented by appointed counsel in a deportation hearing, the hearing officer's failure to appoint counsel does not violate
the "fundamental fairness" requirements of due process when the
alien admits the allegations in the show cause order, and it does
not appear that the presence of an attorney would affect the outcome. Aguilera-Enriquez v. Immigration and Naturalization

Service, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
It has long been accepted that the "refusal by -the government
to harbor persons whom it does not want" is an attribute of its
sovereignty. 8 While recognizing this power, the courts have noneupon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who ...

(11) is, or

hereafter at any time after entry has been, a narcotics addict, or who at any
time has been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law
or regulation relating to traffic in narcotic drugs ....
4. Petitioner was provided with legal counsel through a legal services organi-

zation in Michigan who in turn secured counsel in Texas.
5. This challenge was made pursuant to Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 32(d) provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made
only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but

to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b)(2).
8. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913) (Congress has the power to

deport aliens (here a prostitute) whose presence it deems harmful). This right has
often been reaffirmed by the courts. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
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theless been careful to ensure that before being compelled to leave
this country aliens receive those protections afforded them by Congress and the Constitution. In noting the severity of deportation,
the sixth circuit in United States ex rel. Brancato v. Lehmann
declared, "Although it is not penal in character,

. . .

deportation

is a drastic measure, at times the equivalent of banishment or
exile, for which reason deportation statutes should be given the
narrowest of the several possible meanings.' 'g Two requirements
recognized by the courts in an effort to ameliorate the severity of
deportation are the right of an alien to a fair hearing prior to
deportation ' " and the demands of procedural due process in any
congressionally mandated deportation procedure." At the same
(1952) (alien deported for prior membership in Communist Party); Fong Yue Ting

v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (laborer deported); Kwai Chiu Yuen v.
Immigration and Nationalization Service, 406 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1969) (no unconstitutional abridgment of the power of executive clemency). For an excellent
discussion of the problems surrounding this question see Haney, Deportationand
the Right to Counsel, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 117 (1970). See also Grosh, Immigrants,
Aliens and the Constitution, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1075 (1974); Cordon, Right to
Counselin Immigration Proceedings,45 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1961) and HEssE, The
ConstitutionalStatus of the Lawfully Admitted PermanentResident Alien: The
Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262 (1959).
9. 239 F.2d 663, 666 (6th Cir. 1956). See also Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966) (deportation for unlawful entry); Woodby
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (government
must satisfy its burden of proof in a deportation proceeding); Gastelum-Quinones
v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1962) (deportation for membership in Communist
Party).
10. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1952) (alien has right to notice
and hearing before deportation).
11. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903)
(alien pauper held deportable). There Mr. Justice Harlan noted:
[The] Court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding,
that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute
involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles
that were in due process of law as understood at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution. One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without the opportunity, at some time, to be heard,
before such officers, in respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends . . . . Therefore, it is not competent for . . . any executive officer
. . . arbitrarily to cause an alien, who has entered the country, and has
become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction and a part of its population,
although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported
without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving
his right to be and remain in the United States. No such arbitrary power
can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are recognized.
189 U.S. at 100-101.
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time the courts have held that deportation does not constitute
punishment for a crime but rather represents the result of an administrative procedure designed to provide for the return of undesirable aliens to their own countries. As a consequence, aliens have
not been able to rely on those constitutional protections generally
afforded in criminal proceedings. Instead, aliens must place their
reliance upon statutory provisions and those requirements of procedural due process enunciated by the courts." Specific statutory
provisions concerning an alien's right to counsel at a deportation
proceeding are found in sections 242(b)(2)'" and 292's of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 242(b)(2) provides that in
proceedings to determine deportability "the alien shall have the
privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government)
by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he
shall choose." 5 Section 292 affords the alien a similar privilege in
proceedings before a special inquiry officer or in any appeal before
the Attorney General. 8 The regulations make no provision for appointment of counsel for indigent aliens and no court has seen fit
to regard appointment in such circumstances as a constitutionally
guaranteed right. In the past indigent aliens have frequently raised
this issue on appeal but have met with no success. In Carbonell v.
Immigration andNaturalizationService," the second circuit found
the petitioner's claim to be without merit, relying on the fact that
she had chosen to represent herself at a hearing before the special
inquiry officer. In a later case, that same court considered the issue
raised to be grave, but decliied to "express any opinion on the
question whether, in a deportation hearing where the furnishing of
counsel might have an effect upon the outcome of the deportation
See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modified on rehearing,339
U.S. 908 (1950) (deportation proceedings must conform with the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et. seq.).
12. "Deportation however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure. Both of these doctrines as
original proposals might be debatable, but both have been considered closed for
many years and a body of statute and decisional law has been built upon them."
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952). See also Bugajewitz v.
Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923)
(alien deported for advocating overthrow of government). See generally Aberson,
Deportationof Aliens for Criminal Convictions, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 52 (1974).

13. See note 7 supra.
14.

Immigration and Nationality Act § 292.

15.

See note 7 supra.

16. Immigration and Nationality Act § 292.

17. 460 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
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hearing itself, indigent aliens are entitled to have counsel furnished at government expense." More recently, the fifth circuit
sidestepped the same issue in Villaneuva-Jurado v. Immigration
and NaturalizationService.19 There the court ruled that the petitioner had not in fact raised the question of an indigent's right to
appointed counsel and concluded that the appointment of counsel
"would have been unavailing and hence unnecessary. ' 2 Similarly,
recent decisions of the seventh"1 and ninth2 circuits contain dicta
that suggest a per se rule against providing counsel to indigent

aliens. This position is based on the rationale that since deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature, no reliance can be
placed upon the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel. It
should be noted that in recent decisions, the Supreme Court has
extended this right to other non-criminal proceedings." No court
has yet decided on the merits whether indigent aliens must be
provided counsel in deportation proceedings as a matter of constitutional right.
18.

Henrigues v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 465 F.2d 119, 121

(2d Cir. 1972) (emphasis by court). Earlier second circuit cases had held that
requiring aliens to furnish counsel at their own expense was no denial of due
process. United States ex rel. Wlodinger v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1939)
(appellant's inability to cross-examine witness at deportation hearing not unfair);
United States ex rel. Ciccerelli v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1926) (deportation
hearing at prison not in violation of statute).
19. 482 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1973).
20. Id. at 888. In its opinion the court cited the earlier case of RosalesCabellero v. Immigration and NaturalizationService, 472 F.2d 1158 (1973). There
it remanded the case to the INS to either grant petitioner a hearing on the
question of her alleged indigency or to vacate its prior judgment and grant petitioner a new hearing with the benefit of appointed counsel. The reasoning behind
the court's latter suggestion was based on the fact that she was then represented
by a legal services attorney, and the court assumed that the same attorney or
some other would be willing to represent the petitioner in new proceedings before
the INS.
21. Tupacyupanqui-Marin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 447
F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1971) (no showing by alien of unintelligent waiver of notice of
hearing).
22. Murgia-Melendrez v. Immigration and'Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d
207 (9th Cir. 1969) (no right to counsel at government expense).
23. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The Court here recognized a
right to appointed counsel in probation or parole revocation proceedings. Whether
a particular individual merits such counsel will be determined on a case-by-case

basis. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court held that in a proceeding to
establish "delinquency" a minor must be afforded counsel regardless of his ability
to pay.
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In the instant decision the court evaluated the petitioner's claim
for court-appointed counsel in light of the fundamental fairness
requirement of due process. Emphasizing that "if procedures mandated by Congress do not provide an alien with procedural due
process, they must yield, and the constitutional guarantee of due
process must provide adequate protection during the deportation
process,"24 the court nonetheless found that absence of counsel at
petitioner's hearing before the immigration judge "did not deprive
his deportation proceeding of fundamental fairness."" The court
based this finding on the petitioner's failure to raise a defense to
the charge that he had been convicted of possessing a controlled
substance. He was, therefore, clearly within the purview of section
241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and "no defense for which a lawyer would have helped the argument was
presented to the Immigration Judge for consideration." Moreover, petitioner did have representation at his hearing before the
Board of Immigration Appeals. The lack of counsel, therefore, at
the earlier proceedings did not preclude "full administrative consideration of his argument" at a later stage.,8 Applying an outcome
determinative test and concluding that presence of counsel "could
have obtained no different administrative result,"29 the court held
that fundamental fairness had not been "abridged during the administrative proceedings and [that] the order of deportation
[was] not subject to constitutional attack for a lack of due process.)

30

In a footnote to its opinion, however, the court made it

clear that "where an unrepresented indigent alien would require
counsel to present his position adequately to an immigration
judge, he must be provided with a lawyer at the Government's
24. 516 F.2d at 568.
25. Id. at 569.
26. See note 3 supra.
27. 516 F.2d at 569. In his dissent, Judge DeMascio warns of the dangers
inherent in a court's speculating on what defenses an attorney might raise in a
deportation proceeding and forcefully argues that the severity of the possible

consequences of such proceedings requires appointed counsel in all cases if due
process is to be satisfied. "When the government consents to grant an alien
residency, it cannot constitutionally expel unless and until it affords that alien

due process. Our country's constitutional dedication to freedom is thwarted by a
watered-down version of due process on a case-by-case basis." 516 F.2d at 57374.
28, Id. at 569.
29. Id. at 569.
30. Id. at 569.

Winter 1976]

RECENT DECISIONS

expense,""1 to satisfy the fundamental fairness requirement of due
process. In making this distinction the court criticized the contrary
position taken by the seventh and ninth circuits " that it found to

rest "largely on the outmoded distinction between criminal cases
(where the sixth amendment guarantees indigenta appointed
counsel) and civil proceedings (where the fifth amendment applies)." 3 3 The court supported its position by citing Supreme Court
decisions3 4 extending the right to counsel to areas not within the
criminal law and thereby undermining "the position that counsel
'35
must be provided to indigents only in criminal proceedings.
The decision in the instant case represents a small but significant step forward in the enhancement of constitutional rights of
aliens. For the first time a court has recognized that where the
indigent resident alien is unable to adequately present his position
in a deportation proceeding he must be provided counsel at government expense. Although this privilege is only to be accorded those
indigent aliens who would otherwise be unable to adequately present their positions to an immigration judge, the decision is nonetheless significant in that it recognizes that the furnishing of counsel in such cases is required by due process. Unfortunately, the
court has not seen fit to extend this requirement to all deportation
proceedings but has instead chosen to utilize a case-by-case
method of evaluation. Because it requires a determination of the
alien's ability to adequately present his position in each case, this
procedure may cause more problems than it solves. The problems
inherent in such a means of determination may well render this
standard cumbersome if not unworkable. Additionally, while the
majority cited Gagnon and Gault as a basis for its decision, it
seems to have emphasized the letter rather than the spirit of these
rulings in reaching its own conclusion. As the dissent forcefully
points out, a deportation proceeding is most certainly "adversary"

in nature, and the penalty that may result from an adverse determination is just "as grave as the institutionalization which may
follow an In re Gault finding of delinquency."36 Accordingly, if due
process requirements are to be satisfied, the courts must recognize

31. Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
32. See notes 21 and 22 supra.
33. 516 F.2d at 569.
34. See note 23 supra.
35. 516 F.2d at 568-69.
36. Id. at 572. See note 27 supra.
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a per se rule requiring appointment of counsel in all deportation
proceedings. This would not only be consistent with Gagnon and
Gault but would also ensure that fundamental fairness will be
afforded all aliens, without regard to their circumstances, in deportation proceedings. The court's decision in the instant case unlocks
the door to constitutional equality in deportation proceedings. It

remains to be seen whether this door will be fully opened to afford
indigent resident aliens the constitutional protection that courts
historically have denied.
Charles S. FRench

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION-BANKRUPTCY-U.N.

CON-

VENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBI-

TRAL AWARDS MAKES FOREIGN AWARD A PROVABLE CLAIM WHEN
BANKRUPTCY

COURT HAS No JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN FOREIGN

ARBITRATION PROCEEDING
Copal Company, a Japanese Corporation, contracted in 1966 to
manufacture cameras for Fotochrome, Inc., a Delaware corporation.' The contract provided that any dispute arising therefrom
would be submitted to the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA) in Tokyo for final settlement. One year after the execution of the contract, Copal petitioned the JCAA for arbitration,
alleging money due on the contract. While the arbitration was in
progress, Fotochrome filed for an arrangement under Chapter XI
of the Bankruptcy Act 2 in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The bankruptcy court referee enjoined "all
creditors of the debtor . . . from commencing or continuing any
actions, suits, arbitrations,or the enforcement of any claim in any
Court against this debtor. . . . -3Certified copies of the order were
delivered to the JCAA; Fotochrome attended no subsequent arbitration sessions. The Japanese arbitration panel decided the stay
was ineffective and made an award in favor of Copal.' Copal immediately submitted the award as a provable debt 5 in Fotochrome's
Chapter XI arrangement proceeding, citing the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards' and a bilateral treaty with Japan that provided for
1.

Fotochrome, Inc., a Delaware corporation with offices in the Eastern Dis-

trict of New York, was the product of a 1968 merger of seven corporations. For a

history of these seven corporations' difficulties with the Internal Revenue Service
see In re Fotochrome, 346 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
2. Bankruptcy Act, § 301 et seq., 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Bankruptcy Act].
3. In re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. 26, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (emphasis added).
4. The award was filed in the Tokyo District Court, making it final and
conclusive in Japan. "An (arbitral) award shall have the same effect as a judgment which is final and conclusive between the parties." Japan Code of Civil
Procedure, art. 800, as quoted in In re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. 26, 29 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
5. The belief that the stay was effective apparently induced Copal to file a
proof of claim based solely on the award as a "fixed liability" under the Bankruptcy Act § 63(a)(1), rather than seek confirmation of the award and then file
the judgment as a proof of claim under § 63(a)(5), requiring "provable debts [to
be] reduced to judgments after the filing of the petition and before the consideration of the bankrupt's application for a discharge . . . ." Fotochrome Inc. v.
Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 517. See 377 F. Supp. at 28.
6. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
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reciprocal enforcement of arbitral awards.7 After hearing Fotochrome's objection to allowing Copal's claim, the referee in the
bankruptcy proceeding ruled that his injunction had stayed the
arbitration but that the bankruptcy court could consider the merits of Copal's claim de novo. On appeal, the district court reversed,
holding that Copal was not subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and, therefore, the arbitration had not been enjoined. The
district court ruled that the award was final under Japanese law
and that the provisions of the Treaty on Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation between the United States and Japan and the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards entitled Copal to seek confirmation of
its award as a judgment in the United States. On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. When a foreign arbitration proceeding commenced prior to
the filing of a Chapter XI arrangement petition cannot be enjoined
because of a lack of personal jurisdiction, an award against the
debtor becomes a provable debt under section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act when reduced to judgment in a United States District
Court pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and its enabling
legislation. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Company, 517 F.2d 512 (2d
Cir. 1975).
The National Bankruptcy Act gives the debtor "a new opportunity in life . . .unhampered by the pressure and discouragement

of preexisting debt" 8 by assembling his creditors and settling their
Arbitral Awards, Sept. 1, 1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 (effective Dec. 29, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Convention]
implemented by Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692, 9 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq. (1970)[hereinafter cited as 1970 Amendment].
7. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan, Apr. 2, 1953,

[1953] 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (effective Oct. 30, 1953). Article IV, 2
provides:
Awards duly rendered pursuant to any ...

contracts [providing for arbi-

tration of disputes], which are final and enforceable under the laws of the
place where rendered, shall be deemed conclusive in enforcement proceed-

ings brought before the courts of competent jurisdiction of either Party, and
shall be entitled to be declared enforceable by such courts, except where
found contrary to public policy.
[1953] 4 U.S.T. 2063, at 2068, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 at 7. The treaty was held to be
self-executing in Oregon-PacificForest Products Corp. v. Welsh Panel Co., 248
F. Supp. 903, 910 (D. Ore. 1965).
8. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (gamishment of adjudicated bankrupt's wages enjoined).
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claims. The execution of this basic principle takes several forms,
including straight bankruptcy, which requires a liquidation of the
bankrupt's estate, and less extreme forms that "rehabilitate" the
debtor. The "debtor rehabilitation" chapters' of the Bankruptcy
Act recognize that an insolvent or embarrassed business or individual can sometimes be saved; therefore, liquidation of the estate
should be avoided where possible.10 One method of rehabilitation,
the Chapter XI arrangement, allows both natural persons and corporations to petition voluntarily for authorization to offer to unsecured creditors a plan for settlement or extension of debts." The
plan may not, however, affect the rights of secured creditors.' 2 An
arrangement allows the debtor to continue its business, often without interruption and unencumbered by a trustee's costly administration. 3 The debtor is thereby relieved of the immediate pressures
of his debts. Like the bankrupt in a straight bankruptcy, the
debtor in a Chapter XI arrangement requires protection from creditor suits so that claims can be effectively assembled and a plan
presented without hindrance. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Act gives
to the bankruptcy courts the power to stay actions by creditors,
including actions to enforce liens on the debtor's property.' 4 But
9. Bankruptcy Act, Chapters X through XIII provide for corporate reorganizations (11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.), arrangements (11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.), real
property arrangements (11 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.), and wage earner's plans (11
U.S.C. § 901 et seq.), respectively.
10. Adair v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 303 U.S. 350, 354

(1938) (conciliation commissioner in composition not liable for disbursements to

harvest mortgaged crops). For a brief history of the use of compositions and
arrangements to avoid the harsh effects of bankruptcy see S. RIESENFELD, CASES
628-39 (1967).
11. Bankruptcy Act, § 306.
12. Bankruptcy Act, § 307.
13. Bankruptcy Act, § 342 provides:
Where no receiver or trustee is appointed, the debtor shall continue in
possession of his property and shall have all the title and exercise all the
powers of a trustee appointed under this title, subject, however, at all times
to the control of the court and to such limitation, restrictions, terms, and
conditions as the court may from time to time prescribe.
Section 343 allows the debtor to continue to operate his business:
The receiver or trustee, or the debtor in possession, shall have the power,
upon authorization by and subject to the control of the court, to operate
the business and manage the property of the debtor during such period,
limited or indefinite, as the court may from time to time fix, and during
such operation or management shall file reports thereof with the court at
such intervals as the court may designate.
14. Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, which is applicable to all bankruptcy
proceedings, provides:
AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION
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lawsuits by creditors are not the only hindrance to debtor relief.
Executory contracts between the debtor and a creditor providing
that all disputes between the parties shall be submitted to binding
arbitration may interfere with the court's prerogative to settle or
to supervise the settlement of creditors' claims." Bankruptcy
courts, therefore, refuse to enforce such contracts against a debtor,
and, where arbitration pursuant to a contract is in progress at the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, the court may enjoin the arbitration. 6 The bankruptcy court views the stay of an
A suit which is founded upon a claim from which a discharge would be a
release, and which is pending against a person at the time of filing of the
petition by or against him, shall be stayed until an adjudication or dismissal of the petition ....
Section 314 of the Act, which is applicable only to arrangements, allows the court
an additional power in arrangements, that to stay suits to enforce liens on the
debtor's property. The distinction is no longer important because the power to
enjoin enforcement of liens has been extended to straight bankruptcy cases by
FED. BANKR. R. 601(a).
15. In re Maimon Publishing Co., 34 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)
(Referee) (court refused to specifically enforce executory contract to arbitrate
against trustee in bankruptcy); Kreindler, The Convergence of Arbitration and
Bankruptcy, 26 ARB. J. (n.s.) 34, 37 (1971). Although executory contracts to
arbitrate may interfere with various Bankruptcy Act proceedings, arbitration has
long been permitted in bankruptcy. Section 26 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act first
allowed a trustee "pursuant to the direction of the court, [to] submit to arbitration any controversy arising in the settlement of the estate." Except for 1938
amendments extending § 26 to receivers (Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52
Stat. 855) the law remained unchanged until superseded by FED. BANKR. R. 919(b)
in 1973. Rule 919(b) provides that,
On stipulation of the parties to any controversy affecting the estate [of the
debtor] the court may authorize the matter to be submitted to final and
binding arbitration.
Arbitration under § 26 is most commonly and most effectively used as a means
of liquidating claims and goes hand in hand with the "reasonable estimation" for
liquidating claims permitted under Bankruptcy Act § 57(d). 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 57.15, § 3.3, at 263 (14th ed. 1975). Arbitration is also permissible
under § 57(h) to determine the value of securities held by secured creditors.
16. The issue is not completely settled. Bankruptcy Rule 11-44(a), which
applies to arrangements, provides that "A petition

. . .

shall operate as a stay of

the commencement or continuation of any other court or otherproceeding against
the debtor. . .

."

(emphasis supplied). The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule

11-44 points out that "other proceedings" is meant to include a pending arbitration proceeding within the scope of the automatic stay. The issue has not been
litigated. FED. BANKR. R. 11-44(a).
Before the adoption of Rule 11-44 the question was equally unsettled, both for
arrangements and for straight bankruptcy. There is apparently no arrangement
case on point. Citing a bankruptcy case In re Markowitz Co., (Ref., N.Y.), 6 Am.
Bankr. R. (n.s.) 221 (1925), both COLLIER and REMINGTON agree that arbitration
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arbitration proceeding as necessary to speedy and effective relief
for the debtor under the court's aegis.' 7 On the other hand, binding
arbitration under contract has become an increasingly accepted
alternative to judicial dispute resolution, especially in international commerce.'" The common law view, which was followed by
the overwhelming majority of the states up to 1925," 9 held that
contracts to submit future disputes to binding arbitration were
void because they circumvented established procedures for judicial
dispute resolution.2 The first major change in this position in the
United States came in 1925 when Congress made agreements to
arbitrate binding upon the parties and authorized the district
courts to stay an action where one of the parties to the action had
unjustly refused to arbitrate an issue covered by the contract's
arbitration clause. 2' But because of contrary state laws and an
initial determination that the 1925 Arbitration Act was procedural

in nature,22 the Act was held not to be binding on state courts nor
applicable to diversity cases. 23 Moreover, the Act by its terms did
is not a "suit" within the meaning of § 11(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, which
mandates that pending "suits ...founded upon a claim for which a discharge
would be a release shall be stayed ....

."

However, the referee in Markowitz

clearly bases his holding on other grounds. 1A
at 1148 (14th ed. 1975); 8

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

11.03,

REMINGTON, TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE

3257 (6th ed. 1955). C.f. In re Muskegon Motor Specialities Co.,
313 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1963) (bankruptcy court refused to surrender jurisdiction
to allow employees to arbitrate claims against debtor-employer under collective
bargaining agreement).

UNITED STATES §

17.

8

REMINGTON, TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §

3257, at 90 (6th ed. 1955).
18. See McMahom, Implementationof the U.N. Convention on ForeignArbitralAwards in the U.S., 26 ARB. J. (n.s.) 65, 85 (1971).
19. By 1925, only nine states had statutes making executory contracts to
arbitrate future disputes valid: Arizona, California, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Oregon.
20. For a history of judicial attitudes in the United States and England toward arbitration agreements see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.Amtorg Trading
Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942) (libel for breach of charter party containing
arbitration clause). Typical of the cases decided under the common law rule are
J.T. William & Bro. v.Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N.C. 205, 70 S.E. 290 (1911)
(arbitration clause in contract deprived parties of right to sue and was therefore
void) and Dunton v. Westchester FireIns. Co., 104 Me. 372, 71 A. 1037 (1908)
(arbitration under fire insurance policy clause cannot foreclose judicial determination of insurer's liability).
21. United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1925 Act].
22. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1931); HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
23. "In pre-Erie diversity cases the enforcement of an arbitration agreement
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not provide for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 24 Despite
these shortcomings, the Act was a significant change in the treatment of executory contracts to arbitrate future disputes. Three
events, inter alia, illustrate the movement toward acceptance of
these contracts since the Act's passage in 1925.1 First, numerous
states enacted new statutes so that by 1970 executory contracts to
arbitrate were enforceable in a majority of states.26 Secondly, the
was deemed 'procedural' and state statutes were accordingly held inapplicable."
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 n.3 (2d Cir.

1959). This rule was changed when Erie Railroadheld that federal courts could
not create or apply federal common law in diversity cases but must apply state
law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Guaranty Trust the Court held
that in diversity suits state law must be applied to all questions that are "outcome
determinative." Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The effect of these
two cases was to make state arbitration law applicable to diversity cases. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), rev'g 218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955),
rev'g 122 F. Supp. 733 (D. Vt. 1954) (Vermont law making revocable executory
contracts to arbitrate applied in a diversity suit).
24. Sections 3, 4, and 9 of the 1925 Act have been cited, however, in attempts
to enforce arbitral agreements or foreign arbitral awards. The attempts have met
with mixed results. Because § 4 of the 1925 Act limits the territorial jurisdiction
of the district court in compelling arbitration to arbitration that would take place
in its own district, most cases have held that the courts are powerless to compel
arbitration in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the court is sitting.
International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 93 F. Supp. 798 (D.
Md. 1950), appeal dismissed, 189 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 1951) (U.N. agency libelled
steamship company for breach of charter party). Where the parties have agreed
to arbitrate outside the district, the court will, however, stay proceedings before
it pending arbitration. Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service
Corp., 70 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 449 (1935) (stay of proceedings
granted in diversity breach of contract action). Two earlier cases holding contra,
The Silverbrook, 18 F.2d 144 (E.D. La. 1927) (stay to allow arbitration in London
pursuant to charter party refused) and The Beechwood, 35 F.2d 41 (S.D.N.Y.
1929) (stay to allow foreign arbitration pursuant to a freight contract refused)
have been disapproved. Batson Yarn & Fabrics Machinery Group, Inc. v. SaurerAllma GmbH-Allgauer Maschinenbau, 311 F. Supp. 68, 76 (D.S.C. 1970) (stay
of proceeding granted; power to stay does not depend on power to compel arbitration). Foreign arbitral awards against an American are enforceable under § 13 of
the 1925 Act. Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 n.5 (1974); Danielson v. Entre Rios R.R., 22 F.2d 326 (D. Md. 1972) (dicta) (stay to allow foreign
arbitration granted; any subsequent award enforceable). All of this is merely of
historical interest since Title 9 was changed by the Convention and by its enabling legislation, the 1970 Amendment.
25. Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius:
United States Implements United Nations Convention of the Recognition and
Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwards, in NEW STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL REsoLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 37, 40-41 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as Aksen].
26. Id. at 41.
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Arbitration Act of 1925 was later construed to have created
substantive federal law applicable to both diversity and federal
question cases.? Thirdly, the United States became increasingly
committed to enforcing foreign arbitral awards through reciprocal
enforcement provisions in Treaties of Friendship, Navigation and
Commerce negotiated after 1946.2 As a result of the movement
illustrated by these events, the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards29 was
introduced into a more favorable climate" than were previous mul27. The Second Circuit was first to announce that view, in Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed,
364 U.S. 801 (1960) (based on powers over interstate commerce and maritime
cases). The Supreme Court ratified that interpretation in 1967, saying, "Federal
courts are bound to apply rules enacted by Congress with respect to matters-here a contract involving interstate commerce-over which it has legislative
power." Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)
(action for recission of arbitration clause for fraud in the inducement based on
diversity jurisdiction). See Comment, International Commercial Arbitration
under the United Nations Convention and the Amended Federal Arbitration
Statute, 47 WASH. L. REV. 441 (1972).
28. Walker, Commercial Arbitration-1946-1957,in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ARBITRATION 49 (M. Domke ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ARBIrrRATION]. By 1970, there were eighteen such agreements. Aksen, supra note
26, at 41. These include treaties with the Republic of China, Belgium, France,
Luxemburg, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Israel, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Togo, Thailand, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Iran, Netherlands, and Korea. See
Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 70 Yale L.J.
1049 (1961); Firth, The Finalityof a ForeignArbitral Award, in NEw STRATEGIES
FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIsPUTEs 121 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n ed. 1971).

29. The Convention was the product of the United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, held in New York City in 1958. For the
official records, see U.N.Doc. E/CoNF.26/2 (1958); the proceedings are reported in
U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR (1958). The Conference is discussed in Domke, The
United Nations Conference on International CommercialArbitration,53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 414 (1959).
30. The United States delegation to the Conference recommended against
U.S. accession to the Convention. OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION at 22 (1958). The problems that two members of the delegation saw
are reflected in Czyzak & Sullivan, American Arbitration Law and the U.N.
Convention, 13 ARB. J. (n.s.) 197 (1958). Various individuals and groups, however,

urged that the Convention would be beneficial to the United States and should
be acceded to. ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION, 1960
PROCEEDINGS 194; INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN BRANCH, 1959-60
PROCEEDINGS 84. Almost ten years elapsed from the date that the Convention was
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tilateral treaties on the subject, none of which had been ratified
by the United States."1 As acceded to by the United States in
1970,2 the Convention requires that each contracting state recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance
with its rules of procedure.33 The Convention forbids "more onerous conditions" for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards than for
domestic awards, 34 and enforcement may be refused only on specified grounds, including a conflict with public policy.3 5 Congress

then further defined agreements and awards falling under the Convention 6 and gave to the district courts original jurisdiction over
opened for signature until President Johnson transmitted the Convention to the
Senate for its advice and consent. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, CONVENTION ON
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, S. ExEc. Doc. No.
E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The-Senate's study of the Convention is reflected
in SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON FOREIGN
ARBITRAL AWARDS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
31. Among the conventions to which the United States did not accede were
the Geneva Protocol on Aribtration Clauses, adopted Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S.
158, reprintedin INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION at 283, and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted Sept. 26, 1927, 92
L,N.T.S. 302, reprintedin INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION at 285. The United
States also declined to ratify similar conventions among American nations, such
as the 1940 Montevideo Treaty of International Procedural Law. signed March
19, 1940, reprinted in 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 116 (Supp. 1943). Nor has the United
States acceded to the Code of Private International Law [codigo Bustamente],
signed Feb. 20, 1928, 68 L.N.T.S. 111, discussed in 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (1941), which provides for enforcement of foreign arbitral

awards.

32. The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on October 4, 1968.
Accession was delayed until the necessary implementing legislation could be
prepared. The appropriate bill was approved almost two years later. Act of July
31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 82-25, 84 Stat. 692. For the legislative history of the implementing legislation see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. REP. No. 91-702,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. No. 91-1181,

91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
33. Convention, art. II(1).
34. Id. art. III.
35. Article V(2)(b) provides:
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused
if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
Id. art. V(2)(b); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117, comment c at 340 (1971).
36. The relationship between the parties to the arbitration must be a legal one
and commercial in nature. If the parties are United States citizens, the agreement
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all award confirmation proceedings 7 as well as the authority to
compel arbitration within the parties' agreement and the Convention." Although not based on the Convention, the decision in
Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co. 9 reflects the extent to which the
Convention has enhanced the enforcement of international arbitration agreements. In Scherk a German citizen sought to stay a
civil suit brought against him by an American purchaser of stock
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 so that arbitration pursuant to their contract might proceed. In a 5-4 decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that an executory agreement to arbitrate a dispute arising from a transaction involving a sale of securities shall be enforced, despite the non-waivability of the right to
sue under the Securities Exchange Act.4" In Scherk the Court not
only enforced an executory contract to arbitrate, but in doing so
compromised a significant public policy expressed in the Securities
Exchange Act, that of the non-waivability of the judicial remedy
of an injured securities purchaser. Furthermore, not only is the
public policy in favor of enforcement strong, but also the grounds
for non-enforcement will be narrowly construed."
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals affirmed that the bankruptcy court had no in personam jurisdiction to enjoin the arbitration, either by virtue of territorial jurisdiction or under the
minimum contacts doctrine. 4 Faced with the merits of the case,
or award does not fall within the Convention unless their relationship "involves

property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has

some other reasonable relationship with one or more foreign states." 9 U.S.C. §
202 (1970).
37. 1970 Amendment, 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).

38. Id. § 206.
39.

417 U.S. 506 (1974). See Comment, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901 (1975).

40. The Securities Exchange Act, § 29(a), provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of
this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange
required thereby, shall be void." Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)
(1970).

41. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci6t6 General de L'Industrie Du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). See Comment, 8 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 935 (1975).
42.

International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) ("contacts,

ties or relations"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 325 (1958) ("minimum
contacts"). The territorial jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is set forth in 11
U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
§ 7 (1965); see also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339-42 n.11 (2d Cir. 1972) (U.S. contacts in sale of
British securities by British defendants to American Corporation).

THE UNITED STATES
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the court found that the arbitration award must be recognized as
a binding adjudication on the merits for two reasons. First, the
plain language of Article III of the Convention mandated that
result. 3 Secondly, the court concluded that in some circumstances
an in personam suit against the debtor, which is commenced before
the bankruptcy proceeding, may be allowed to continue to judgment in a state court, without the participation of the receiver or
trustee, the judgment being accepted as an adjudication of the
existence of the indebtness."1 The court found the JCAA arbitration to be an analogous situation and pointed out that the result
in this case was even more compelling because Fotochrome had
actually participated in the arbitration. Thus both the Convention
and case law suggested that the award be recognized as a binding
adjudication on the merits and, therefore, unreviewable by the
bankruptcy court. This, however, did not settle the issue of the
status of the award for purposes of the arrangement proceeding.
Despite the award's status as a judgment in Japan, the court refused to accord it similar status in the arrangement proceeding.
The court found that, as a matter of domestic law, a foreign award
can never be self-executing in the forum state. 5 To allow an award
to be self-executing would foreclose the party against whom enforcement is sought from challenging the award on the limited
grounds specified by the Convention." Therefore, on grounds of
43.

"Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and

enforce them ....

."

Convention, art. HI.

44. In Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218 (1929), the Supreme Court concluded
that an in personam default judgment on a creditor's bill, commenced before the
appointment of a federal equity receiver, established conclusively the existence

and amount of the creditor's claim even though the receiver failed to defend. The
court emphasized that its holding applied only to equity receiverships because,
unlike the bankruptcy court, a federal court sitting in equity could not have
enjoined the creditor's suit in a state court under 28 U.S.C. § 379. The instant
court also pointed to Doyle v. Nemerov's Executors, 223 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1955).
In that case a state proceeding for allowances to attorneys, which had begun prior

to the filing of a Chapter X reorganization petition, continued to judgment after
the filing of the petition. No stay had issued to the state court. The court of

appeals held that, despite the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over
the debtor and his property in Chapter X proceedings (11 U.S.C. § 111), the filing

of the petition did not automatically deprive the state court of jurisdiction and
that, therefore, the state court judgment was conclusive as to the validity and

amount of the claim.
45. Here the court cited Lorenzen, CommercialArbitration-Enforcementof
ForeignAwards, 45 YALE L.J. 39, 56 (1935). 517 F.2d at 519.
46. Convention, art. V.
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due process, the court found that Copal's award was not a "prova-

ble debt" within § 63(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and that the filing
of the proof of claim was premature. The court held that in order
to reduce the award to judgment (and therefore a provable debt),
Copal must seek confirmation in a district court pursuant to the

Convention's enabling statutes. The court pointed out that this
holding is in no way counter to the Convention's requirements. The

Convention, the court said, clearly distinguishes between the contracting state's duties to recognize and to enforce an award. Under
the Convention recognition is mandatory; this is satisfied when the
award is held to be dispositive of the merits of a claim. Enforcement, however, is conditioned upon satisfaction of the procedural
requirements of the forum in which enforcement is sought. In mandating that Copal seek confirmation of the award, the court said
that it was merely satisfying a fundamental procedural requirement-the due process right of the losing party to contest the
award on the limited grounds available. In so holding the court
recognized and enforced in a Chapter XI arrangement proceeding
a foreign arbitral award rendered after a bankruptcy referee's unsucessful attempt to stay the arbitration. While acknowledging
that its holding had the anomalous result of permitting foreign
arbitration against an American debtor to proceed while domestic
creditors were precluded from seeking similar relief, the court
pointed out that next time the arbitration might be American and
the bankrupt Japanese.
The instant case goes further than Scherk in compromising domestic policy in order to enforce a foreign arbitral award. Here the

court not only allowed the American party to waive determination
of his case in an American court, but also allowed the arbitration
to affect the rights of American creditors and the interests of the
bankruptcy court. This enforcement of a foreign award notwithstanding domestic considerations will increase confidence among
the Convention's other contracting states in America's recent commitment to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. Now
more certain of an award's enforcement, parties to international
commercial contracts can confidently choose to settle their disputes by arbitration and avoid the expense and inconvenience of
litigation in a foreign forum. Overall, this lessens the risks involved
in international business transactions and encourages straightforward negotiation for convenient and accessible non-judicial
remedies for redress of grievances. The effect of the instant decision on domestic procedural law is equally commendable. The
court harmonized the procedural requirements of the Bankruptcy
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Act, the Convention, and due process without the slightest violence to any of the three. Conspicuously absent from the court's
opinion, however, is consideration of the disquieting chasm, apparent in the instant case, between the jurisdictional requirements for
effective bankruptcy administration and the incapacity of foreign
arbitration to meet those requirements.47 The very existence of
exclusive federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy in the United
States argues for the need for no less pervasive an authority to
manage such complex and far-reaching disturbances to commerce.
But there exists no similar authority to handle cases of financial
collapse within the international business community." On the
other hand, an arbitration panel in a case such as the instant one
is incapable of considering the interests of all affected by its decision. The arbitration, therefore, becomes a proceeding of transnational significance and the enforcement of the award is made other
than a matter of equal treatment with domestic awards. In situations like this, the Convention provision allowing non-enforcement
as against public policy might be used as a safety valve whereby a
particular case not capable of satisfactory consideration or resolution by a foreign arbitral panel might be rechanneled to a traditional judicial body. Admittedly, it is questionable whether the
interests protected are worth the high cost in confidence of foreign
businessmen destroyed thereby. But the memory of the common
law courts' excesses in protecting their parochial interests should
not be allowed to obscure abiding interests not so parochial; nor
should the advantages of arbitration to international commerce
prevent determination of its limitations and the assertion of domestic jurisdiction wherever appropriate.
Ronald M. Morris

47. "This case is not without irony. The treaties force use to remove the factor
of alienage in determining the recognition of arbitral awards .... But, in terms
of injunctive power the common law factor of alienage remains ....

Copal thus

benefits both from the treaties' removal of alienage and from the common law's
insistence upon it." 377 F. Supp. at 31.
48. The European Economic Communities has recently produced a draft convention on bankruptcies and insolvency proceedings within EEC countries. For a
survey of its provisions and a discussion of some of its difficulties, see Hunter,
The Draft Bankruptcy Convention of the European Economic Communities, 21
INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 682 (1972).

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND-IN NEW YORK
COURTS NATIONALS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND MEMBER
STATES MAY SEEK TORT DAMAGES FROM PERSONS WHO INDUCED THE
FOREIGN NATIONAL TO VIOLATE ITS COUNTRY'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE
LAWS

Plaintiff, a private Brazilian bank, brought an action for fraud
and sought rescission of a foreign exchange contract' and damages
against two2 unnamed defendants. Plaintiff alleged that false currency applications submitted by the defendants induced the bank
to violate Brazilian exchange regulations. Both the United States
and Brazil are members of the International Monetary Fund
(I.M.F.). The Bretton Woods Agreement, which created the Fund,
provides that exchange contracts violative of a member state's
foreign exchange regulations shall be unenforceable in any other
member state and that members may, by mutual accord, develop

measures making the Agreement more effective.3 Plaintiff argued
that, in accordance with the Bretton Woods Agreement and on
principles of international comity, the state courts of the United
States can provide a tort remedy for an alien corporation which
was fraudulently induced by nationals of the forum state to violate
its country's foreign exchange regulations. Defendant contended
that New York courts should not enforce governmental rights of
another state created by the foreign exchange laws of that state,
that the Bretton Woods Agreement does not authorize recognition
of tort claims arising out of the exchange laws of another member
1.

The exchange contract resulted in an improper exchange by the bank of

Brazilian cruzeiros into travelers checks in United States dollars totalling
$1,024,000.
2. The case as reported refers to "20" unnamed defendants, but the Appellate
Division refers to only two defendants, and the case specifically refers to two
"John Does." 44 App. Div.2d 353, 355 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1974). Therefore it shall be
assumed that there was a printing error and there were only two defendants.
3. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, adopted Dec.
27, 1945, art. VIII, § 2(b), 60 Stat. 1401 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39
[hereinafter cited as The Bretton Woods Agreement]. Section 2(b) of Article VIII
reads as follows:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and
which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member
maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member. In addition, members may, by
mutual accord, co-operate in measures for the purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either member more effective, provided that
such measures and regulations are consistent with this Agreement.
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country, and that the court cannot broaden the scope of the Agree-

ment without the official consent of the federal government. The
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, modified the order
of the New York Supreme Court4 and granted the defendant's

motion to dismiss on the ground that the courts of one country do
not enforce the currency regulations or the statutory penalties of
another. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held reversed
and remanded. When a private corporation incorporated in an
I.M.F. member state seeks redress for tortious inducement to violate its country's exchange laws, New York courts can provide a

forum for the private tort action in accordance with Article VIII,
section 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement. Banco Frances e
Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe, 36 N.Y.2d 592, 331 N.E.2d -502, 370
N.Y.S.2d 534, cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3205 (Oct. 6, 1975).
The recognition and application of foreign exchange laws raise
two issues which the court must consider: (1) whether the law in
question should be characterized as a revenue law, whereby a determination must be made as to the applicability of the traditional
rule that "no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of
another, '" 5 and (2) whether federal or state public policy requires
or prohibits the application of the law. The revenue law rule is
generally considered as a part of the penal law rule' in the United
4. The New York Supreme Court granted plaintiffs motion for ancillary relief
(inspection of the bank accounts into which the money had been deposited and
disclosure of the identities of the defendants by their attorneys, but dismissed the
cause of action for damages). 36 N.Y.2d 592, 331 N.E.2d 502, 503, 370 N.Y.S.2d
534, 537 (1975).
5. Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775). Holman held that
a French plaintiff could recover under English law on a contract made and executed in France because the subsequent illegal acts of the defendants (smuggling
tea into England) did not taint the plaintiff's cause of action. In dictum the court
stated that if French law were to be applied the French court could not look to
the revenue laws of England as a basis for dismissing the cause of action. There-

fore the plaintiff had a cause of action in either forum.
6. The penal law rule is: "The courts of no country execute the penal rules of
another ......

The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). The following

cases illustrate the interrelation between penal and revenue rules: Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413-14, 448 (1963) (penal and revenue
rules do not apply to an expropriation fully executed in a foreign state); Wisconsin
v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289-91 (1887) (the penal law rule applies to
criminal law enforcement as well as to recovery of pecuniary penalities for violations of state revenue protection statutes); Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401,
184 N.E.2d 167, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1962); A. DIcEY & J. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS
75-79 (9th ed. J. Morris ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as DIcEY & MORRIS]; R.
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States; therefore the courts have applied the rules interchangeably,7 and an analysis of both rules is required. Judge Learned Hand
characterized the policy behind these rules as the protection of
state sovereignty. 8 Hand explained that the courts of one state are
not empowered to execute the penal laws of another because penal
laws strike at the core of the relation of sovereign and citizen.
There has been discontent with the penal law rule in general and
the revenue law rule in particular for some time9 as shown by the
case law 10 and the changes made in the Restatement (Second) of
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 107-10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LEFLAR,
CONFLICTS]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 89, comment b at 264

(1971); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46
HARv. L. REV. 193 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement].
7. Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1887). The penal law rule
was applied by the Court in an action by Wisconsin to enforce a Wisconsin
penalty for failure to file tax papers against a Louisiana corporation, and Wisconsin's cause of action was dismissed.
8. More v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J. concurring). A
political sub-division of Indiana was precluded from collecting taxes in New York
because taxes (like criminal liabilities) are a function of state sovereignty and
settled principles of private international law preclude one state from enforcing
another's penal or revenue laws.

9. See Leflar, ExtrastateEnforcements, supra note 6 at 215-17.
10.

The term "penal" has been restricted to criminal law in its most literal

sense. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892) (restricting penal claims to
those which seek to punish an offense against the public as opposed to claims
seeking a private remedy for one injured by the wrongful act of another). Subsequently it was held that when a state agency seeks to recover a primarily compensatory claim in a sister state, such a claim is not penal and full faith and credit

should not be denied. New York v. Coe Mfg. Co., 112 N.J.L. 536, 172 A.198 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1934) (franchise tax owed by a corporation to New York for doing
business there is not a penalty but rather a debt incurred by the corporation when
New York admitted it to do business). The full faith and credit clause has been
interpreted to require enforcement of sister state tax judgments. Milwaukee
County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (obligation to pay taxes is not a
penal, but rather a statutory obligation). Therefore tax judgments are given the
same full faith and credit as other judgments. While the Supreme Court has never
ruled on whether full faith and credit should be given a sister state's tax claim
not reduced to judgment, some courts have broadened the meaning of Milwaukee
County v. M.E. White Co. to include such claims. See, e.g., New York v. Shapiro,
129 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass. 1954) (an uncontested New York City administrative
decision as to taxes and tax penalties is entitled to full faith and credit in Massachusetts); State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Nelly, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d
150 (1955) (Oklahoma can maintain an action in Arkansas courts to recover its
income tax due, irrespective of Arkansas reciprocity statute); Detroit v. Gould,
12 Ill.2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (1957) (Illinois courts recognize Detroit's personal
property tax claim on principles of comity); State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
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Conflict of Laws." In Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.,'" the
Supreme Court recognized the right of a state to enforce a tax
judgment of a sister state but left open the question of whether a

tax assessment not reduced to judgment could be enforced. When
that very situation arose in New York, the court in Philadelphia
v. Cohen'3 applied the traditional penal law analysis but denied
recovery on the basis of the legislative policy stated in New York's
reciprocal tax statute. 4 In its analysis of the penal law rule, the
court found there was no requirement that it apply Pennsylvania
law, but the court did not say that the revenue law rule prohibited
the application of the sister state's law. The New York court has,
therefore, left open the possibility that, under different circumstances with different policy considerations, the court could enforce a revenue law of another state. The Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws is also indicative of the trend away from the broad
use of the penal law rule. Section 89 of The Restatement (Second)
clarifies the ambiguities in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
section 611, by narrowing the scope of the rule to actions brought
by the state in a sister state's forum to recover a fine for a violation
of its criminal5 law. Because the cases are divided, the
v. Rogers, 283 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946) (revenue laws are not within
the meaning of the penal law rule, and because Missouri has no public policy
against inc6me tax, it will enforce Oklahoma's tax claim). Arguably, tax claims
fall within the "public acts" standard of Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
The Supreme Court held that the Illinois wrongful death statute was a "public
act" within the meaning of the Constitutional provision that "full faith and credit
shall be given in each state to the public acts ... of every other state." 341 U.S.

at 611. On that basis, full faith and credit should be extended to tax claims by
sister states. See also H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 99-100
(4th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as GOODRICH]; LEFLAR, CONFLICTS, supra note 6,
at 108-09, 203-04, 641-43. But see Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,
348 U.S. 66 (1954).
11.

See note 15 infra and accompanying text.

12. See note 10 supra.
13. 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 167, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1962) (finding the
Pennsylvania tax assessment penal and no law in Pennsylvania corresponding to
New York RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF TAX LIABILITIES ACr §§ 901-903 (McKinney 1975), the court held the tax assessment unenforceable in New York).
14. The court gave considerable weight to the legislative policy announced in
New York's reciprocal tax enforcement act. These acts have been a means to
avoid the revenue law rule and to apply the more reasonable policy that tax
evasion should not go unpunished in the courts merely because the taxpayer has
left the state in which the taxes are owed. See Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement,
supra note 6, at 202; GOODRICH, supra note 10, at 99-100.
15. Section 611, comment a of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws defines a
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Restatement Second offers no opinion whether tax claims of one
state should be enforced by another state. 8 In Banco do Brasil v.
Israel Commodity Co., '7 the New York court denied the bank a
remedy for tortious inducement to violate Brazilian exchange regulations because (1) it was a government instrumentality,18 (2) the
court had characterized the rule as a revenue law, " and (3) Article
VIII, section 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement did not provide
for affirmative tort actions. 0 Because of the presence of the foreign
government instrumentality in the case it did not provide a good
opportunity to begin the erosion of the revenue law rule."' The
second element to be considered by the court when applying foreign law is public policy. The policy considerations relating to the
penalty as including money exacted for the punishment of a civil wrong (as
distinguished from compensation for a civil wrong). The Restatement (Second),

limited to criminal wrongs, makes a clearer and more rational distinction. For a
discussion of the advantages of the criminal limitation see Leflar, Extrastate
Enforcement, supra note 6, at 225.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT

OF

LAWS, Explanatory Notes § 89,

comment b at 264 (1971).
17. 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, cert. denied, 376 U.S.
906 (1964) (a Brazilian government instrumentality, the Bank of Brazil, cannot
maintain an action in tort for damages resulting from fraudulent inducement to
violate the foreign exchange regulations of Brazil).
18. "No state is entitled directly or indirectly to enforce outside its own territory its prerogative rights or public laws." F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY
428 (3d ed. 1971). See Williams, ExtraterritorialEnforcement of Exchange Control Laws Under the InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L L.
319, 373 (1975).
19. There is authority that this was an improper characterization. Kahler v.
Midland Bank Ltd., [1950] A.C. 24, 36; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 6, at 917.
20. Article VIII, section 2(b) specifically mentions exchange contracts and
mutual accords which make the agreement more effective, but there is no language which requires the courts of one country to enforce the monetary tort claims
of another member country. See note 3 supra.
21. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892), distinguished an action
by a state seeking to "punish an offense against the public justice of the state"
from the action by a private citizen seeking redress for a wrongful act. The state
action was termed penal and the private action was considered non-penal. Following this decision, some courts distinguished laws as penal on the basis of whether
they granted rights to the government (or a subdivision thereof) or a private
individual. This was particularly true with tax claims. E.g., Philadelphia v.
Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 167, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1962) (Pennsylvania
not allowed to enforce a tax claim in New York); Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y.
71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921) (Colorado not allowed to collect Colorado inheritance
taxes in New York on an estate distributed in New York). See LEFLAR, CONFLICTS,
supra note 6, at 108.
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decision of whether to and how to apply the Bretton Woods Agreement are unique. Some courts have resorted to conflicts law to
determine what emphasis if any should be given to foreign law in
cases involving contracts with foreign countries. 22 Other courts
have found foreign exchange regulations contrary to some local
public policy, such as the policy that no state enforces the revenue
laws of another state.n In contrast to these two approaches the
Executive Directors of the I.M.F. interpreted Article VIII, section
2(b) to mean (1) that a member country shall not ignore the exchange control regulations of another member on the grounds that
they conflict with the public policy of the forum, and (2) that the
exchange regulations of another member state cannot be ignored
because the law of which they are a part is deemed inapplicable
according to the forum's choice of law rule.Y In support of the

Directors' position the United States has bound itself to give effect
under its domestic laws to the undertaking in Article VIII, section
2(b) of the Agreement.25 Although the Bretton Woods Agreement

has been referred to by United States courts, no court has specifically adopted the Executive Directors' interpretation. The closest
the courts have come to such a far reaching application is the

Supreme Court's directive in Kolovrat v. Oregon21 where the Court
stated that the Bretton Woods Agreement established a national
22. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953)
(when a pension contract was made and intended to be executed in Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakian law applies).
23. Banco do Brasil v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d
235, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964).
24. The letter from the Executive Directors interpreting Article VII, section
2(b). I.M.F. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTnE DmEcTORs 82-83 (1949). The authority for such an interpretation is found in Article XVIII (a) of the Agreement,
which provides: "Any question of interrelation of the provisions of this Agreement
arising between any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund
shall be submitted to the Executive Directors for their decision ...

"

See note

3 supra.
25. Article XX, section 2(a) provides: "each government on whose behalf this
Agreement is signed shall deposit with the Government of the United States of
America an instrument setting forth that it has accepted this Agreement in accordance with its law and has taken all steps necessary to enable it to carry out
all of its obligations under this Agreement." See note 3 supra.The United States
incorporated the first sentence of Article VIII, section 2(b) into the statute law of
the United States by the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 22 U.S.C. § 286h (1970).
26. 366 U.S. 187 (1960) (state courts cannot refuse to give recognition to foreign exchange regulations on the basis that enforcement of such regulations would
risk decreasing the size of an estate in probate).
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policy which the state courts must respect. The New York cases
which have dealt with the Agreement have been decided on both
an interpretation of the Agreement and either the choice of law or
public policy grounds.Y The division of opinion over how broadly
Article VIII, section 2(b) should be applied is best illustrated by
the two interpretations of the Perutz v. Bohemian National Bank
case.28 Perutz held that a pension contract made in Czechoslovakia, with the intent that it be executed there, was governed by
Czechoslovakian law, and the exchange regulations that prohibited distribution of funds to nonresidents were applicable because
they were in accord with United States policy as evidenced by the
Bretton Woods Agreement. One interpretation of this case is that
because the court did not rely specifically on Article VIII, section
2(b) of the Agreement the court did not want to be restricted to
the "exchange contract" language. 21 Instead, the court was saying
that the Agreement is also controlling policy on cases not fitting
within the "exchange contract" language." The alternative, and
more limited, view is that the court's decision was based on Article
VIII, section 2(b); therefore the case must be construed as falling
27. Banco do Brasil v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d
236, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964) (Brazilian Bank denied
a remedy for tortious inducement to violate Brazilian exchange regulations (1)
because affirmative tort actions are not within the scope of the Bretton Woods
Agreement, and (2) because the courts of no state enforce the revenue laws of
another); Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953)
(pension contract unenforceable in New York (1) because enforcement would
violate the purpose of the Bretton Woods Agreement, and (2) because private
international conflict of laws rules direct New York to apply Czechoslovakian
law); Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank of New York, 11 Misc.
2d 397, 173 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (contract designed to avoid Italian
exchange control held unenforceable (1) because enforcement would be contrary

to the Bretton Woods Agreement and (2) because New York will not enforce
illegal contracts); Kraus v. Zivnostenska Banka, 187 Misc. 681, 64 N.Y.S.2d 208
(Sup. Ct. 1946) (funds deposited in Prague, with no provision to the contrary, are
not payable in the United States (1) because the exchange law of Czechoslovakia

governs according to conflict of laws rules, and (2)in passing the court recognizes
that this result conforms with the requirements of the Bretton Woods Agreement).
28. See note 22 supra.
29. See note 3 supra.
30. Gold, The InternationalMonetary Fund and PrivateBusiness Transactions: Some Legal Effects of the Articles of the Agreement, INT'L MONETARY FUND
PAMP. SERIEs No. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Gold]; Williams, Extraterritorial
Enforcement of Exchange Control Regulations Under the InternationalMonetary
FundAgreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 319 (1975).
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within the "exchange contract" language.' Banco do Brasil" impliedly limits Perutz to the more limited interpretation. In Banco
do Brasil the court found that Article VIII, section 2(b) did not
require that a forum be provided for a government instrumentality
of an I.M.F. member. In so holding the court distinguished Perutz
as a contracts case and characterized the facts at hand as requiring
the enforcement of a foreign revenue rule. 33 A court not only looks

to the public policy of the state in which it sits, but in any case
touching on international relations, the state court must also consider the policy of the federal government. The Supreme Court has
generally deferred to the executive branch on all policy issues
touching international relations.3 1 The position of the United
States as to Article VIII, section 2(b), expressed in a brief from the
Solicitor General which was requested by the Supreme Court before denying certiorari in Banco do Brasil, is that nothing in the
Agreement requires state courts to give a remedy in tort based on
exchange violations in other member countries.35
The court in the instant case concluded that the penal law rule
was neither precedentially nor analytically justifiable. The court
found that the origin of the rule at common law was dicta in a case
concerned primarily with the effect of revenue laws on international commerce, and only hypothetically concerned with the enforcement of revenue laws.36 In addition it was found that the
analytical basis of the rule has been eroded both by scholars who
have expressed doubt as to the soundness of the rule,3 7 and by court
decisions which have enforced tax assessments as well as tax judgments. The court went on to distinguish the instant case from
31.

F.

MANN,

THE LEGAL ASPECTS

OF

MONEY 433 (3d ed. 1971); Meyer,

Recognition of Exchange Controls After the International Monetary Fund

Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867 (1953). It should be noted that these authors do not
take the same position on the interpretation of the term "exchange contract."
32.
33.

See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
12 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 190 N.E.2d 235, 237, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (1963).

34. Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398 (1969) (per curiam); Zschemig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1967); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1960); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1936) (New York could not maintain its own public policy
in its own courts contrary to the federal policy inherent in the Litvinov Assignments).
35. Brief by Solicitor General as amicus curiae for the Supreme Court on,
Banco do Brasil v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235,
239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1964), as cited in Gold at 30-31, see note 30 supra.

36. Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775).
37.

Leflar, ExtrastateEnforcement, see note 6 supra.
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Banco do Brasil on the basis that the plaintiff in that case was an
instrumentality of the Brazilian government, whereas the plaintiff
in this case was a private party. The court reasoned that with
private parties the policy of protecting the sovereign does not
apply; therefore the rationale of the penal law rule would be inapplicable. The court found that Article VIII, section 2(b) of the
Bretton Woods Agreement was applicable to the case. Because
there is nothing in Article VIII, section 2(b) that prohibits recognition of a tort claim arising out of an exchange law violation, and
because the United States has a policy of cooperation with the
Bretton Woods signatories, the court provided a forum and a remedy for the Brazilian bank. The dissenting opinion applied the
rationale of Banco do Brasil and found that (1) the penal law rule
was applicable and precluded the court from providing a forum,
(2) the Bretton Woods Agreement should be narrowly construed as
applying only to "exchange contracts" and not as providing a new
cause of action, and (3) without a federal policy specifically broadening the scope of the Agreement the courts of one state should not
take the responsibility for expanding the scope of the Agreement
in United States courts.
The court in the instant case made two modifications of existing

New York law: (1)it eroded the revenue law rule to the extent, at
least, that it is inapplicable to the enforcement of foreign exchange
regulations by private parties; and (2) the court expanded the
scope of the Bretton Woods Agreement in New York. While the
court's analysis of the revenue rule may indicate that the New
York courts are dispensing with the rule, the case of Philadelphia
v. Cohen still stands as good law. Therefore, it is difficult to say
how far the courts will expand this case. A practical result of the
court's action is an increased predictability in foreign exchange
dealings38 since there is now more assurance that the exchange
regulations of an I.M.F. member state will be applied in the New
York courts. In addition to limiting the revenue rule, the court
expanded its application of the Bretton Woods Agreement. This
helps to clarify what the New York courts are doing in this area.
First, the case revitalizes Perutz to the extent that commentators
have interpreted it to mean that actions other than those involving
"exchange contracts" are within the meaning of the Agreement.39
38. Cabot, Exchange Control and the Conflict of Laws: An Unsolved Puzzle,
99 U. PA. L. REv. 476 (1951); Meyer, Recognition of Exchange ControlsAfter the
InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867 (1953).
39. See note 31 supra.
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Secondly, Banco do Brasil has been limited to the specific fact that
a government instrumentality will not be permitted to enforce its
own laws in another country. These two results indicate that the
private plaintiff having dealings affected by exchange regulations
of an I.M.F. member state has a forum in which it can seek a
remedy if exchange regulations raise an issue to be adjudicated.
The Solicitor General's opinion, relating to Banco do Brasilwhich
indicated that courts are not required to provide a remedy,4" coupled with this case, leaves the impression that courts are not precluded from providing a remedy in tort for fraudulent inducement
to violate a foreign state's exchange regulations. This indicates
that the interpretation of Article VIII, section 2(b) can be as broad
or as narrow as the state court wants, with the caveat that the
national policy, as expressed in Kolovrat, is that the Agreement,
where applicable, cannot be ignored.
Mary Beth Reynolds Blake
40.

See note 35 supra.

